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ABSTRACT
Believing that an information Revolution of Military Affairs has occurred, the US
military is currently transforming to achieve dominance over the full spectrum of deployment
scenarios with a lighter, more mobile, and more capable force. Establishing a far-reaching,
robust, ubiquitous ISR and telecommunications network, and a network-centered fighting
doctrine are keys to this endeavor. Of the many systems needed, satellite communications are
especially significant because they are the prime method of transmitting high quantities of
information to remote and mobile units.
The People's Republic of China too has become aware of the information Revolution
of Military Affairs, as well as the vulnerabilities associated with it. Though the People's
Republic is still in the process of modernizing its society and military, the doctrines and
advantages of Information Warfare have not been lost to it. It seeks to equip itself with the IT
and skill sets that are becoming increasingly more available to asymmetrically affect the
information usage of a technologically superior adversary.
As it stands, the military's use of satellite communications is vulnerable. Though some
satellite communications have inherent protective qualities, they are still susceptible to some
variants of Electronic Attack and anti-satellite attack. Military-dedicated systems do not offer
enough security, and the lack of bandwidth they provide forces the military to use much less
secure commercial systems.
It appears that the People's Republic presents only a moderate threat to the military's
satellite communications. This will not always be the case. The rapid growth of People's
Republic and its increasing informationalization, as well as the expanding US military demand
for wideband systems and predictions of a continuing shortfall, all place the military's satellite
communications in a precarious situation.
Thesis Advisor: Taylor Fravel
Title: Assistant Professor of Political of Science
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Glossary of Acronyms
AFSATCOM - Air Force Satellite Communications
AJ - Anti-Jamming
ARM - Anti-:Radiation Missile
ASAT - Anti-Satellite Attack
BER - Bit Error Rate
BLOS - Beyond-Line-of-Sight
C2W - Command and Control Warfare
C412SR - Command Control Computer Intelligence Information Sensor Reconnaissance
CBO - Congressional Budget Office
CNA - Computer Network Attack
COMERSAT -- Commercial Satellite
CONUS - Continental United States
CW - Continuous Wave
dB - Decibels
DEW - Directed-Energy Weapon
DoD - Department of Defense
DSCS - Defense Satellite Communications System
EA - Electronic Attack
ECM - Electronic Countermeasures
ECCM - Electronic Counter-Countermeasures
EHF - Extremely High Frequency
EMP - Electromagnetic Pulse
EP - Electronic Protection
ES - Electronic Support
EW - Electronic Warfare
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FCS - Future Combat System
FLTSATCOM - Fleet Satellite Communications
Gbps - Gigabits per Second
GBS - Global Broadcast Service
GEO - Geosynchronous Earth Orbit
GHz - Gigahertz
GPS - Global Positioning System
HEMP - High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
IO - Information Operations
IRBM - Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
iRMA - Information Revolution in Military Affairs
ISR - Intelligence Sensor Reconnaissance
IT - Information Technology
ITU - International Telecommunications Union
IW - Information Warfare
J/S - Jamming to Signal Ration
JTIDS - Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
kbps - Kilobits per Second
kHz - Kilohertz
LDR - Low Data Rate
LEASAT - Leased Satellite
LEO - Low Earth Orbit
LF - Low Frequency
LOS - Line of Sight
Mbps - Megabits per Second
MEO - Medium Earth Orbit
MDR - Medium Data Rate
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MHz - Megahertz
MILSATCOM - Military Satellite Communications
MILSTAR - Military Strategic and Tactical Relay
MRLS - Multiple Rocket Launchers
NCA - National Command Authority
OIF - Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPSEC - Operations Security
PLA - People's Liberation Army
PLAN - People's Liberation Army Navy
PRC - People's Republic of China
PYSOPS - Psychological Operations
RF - Radio Frequency
SATCOM - Satellite Communications
SHF - Super High Frequency
SIGINT - Signals Intelligence
SIOP - Single Integrated Operation Plan
SNR - Signal to Noise Ratio
SRBM - Short Range Ballistic Missile
SS - Spread Spectrum
TT&C - Tracking, Telemetry, and Control
UAV - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UFO - Ultra High Frequency Follow-On
UHF - Ultra High Frequency
USN - United States Navy
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the vulnerabilities that exist in the US
military's satellite communications and the Information Warfare threat the People's
Republic of China may pose to them. By recognizing both the vulnerabilities and
accounting for the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) ability to threaten satellite
communications (SATCOM) systems, this thesis finds that the PRC does pose a credible,
though moderate Information Warfare threat to the US military's SATCOM in the form of
noise jamming and possibly anti-satellite attack (ASAT).
The genesis of this thesis came from observations of what the US military and
scholars are saying about the future and about Information Warfare (IW). The current
military rhetoric of what its future warfare model will be stresses information,
communication, mobility, and economy of force. Such a model requires the ability to
disseminate large amounts of information to widely dispersed units. This requirement
cannot be satisfied by fiber optic cable or other landlines because it would constrain how
quickly the force could move. Therefore, satellite communications is considered the
prevalent means through which this information will flow. This, however, is problematic
for two reasons. Firstly, because, as much of what is being said about Information Warfare
states, information dependent entities can be asymmetrically victimized by the disruption
of information and that the means to do so are becoming increasingly accessible.
Secondly, because the partially secure military-dedicated satellites that exist can only
provide for a minimal amount of the enormous bandwidth demands, the military must use
commercially leased satellite communications which are far less secure. Vulnerabilities in
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SATCOM to IW then take on great importance, being the critical and seeming weak link
in the communications chain.
Another facet of what some scholars believe to be the future is a near-term
competitor in the form of the PRC. The PRC's fantastic growth over the course of the past
decade, its estimated future economic and military potential, and its position near US
allies and interests have all played their part in this formulation. While the PRC may be
able to become a regional hegemon in the next few decades, it is currently incapable of
projecting much power beyond its borders. This, however, is not stopping the PRC from
working towards their goal of becoming a world power. Influenced by the US's highly
successful military actions over the past decade, its information infused rhetoric, some of
the asymmetric concepts of IW, and the delicate Taiwan situation, the PRC have come to
believe that the US is its most obvious competitor and that IW may be a key to fighting it.
The PRC may not have the same high-tech weapon systems and doctrines as the US, but it
does have some technical know-how and the desire to exploit the US's information
dependence. This points to China as being maybe not a near-term competitor, but a
possible current IW threat.
If these hints about a potential vulnerability and Chinese IW threat proved true, it
would appear that the military may not have fully realized all of the implications of IW or
the true threats that are set against it. This would not bode well for a future where IW
offers an advantage to lesser powers and individuals possibly too good to pass up. These
conclusions are not unjustified and are worth examining.
The US military is currently in a period of Transformation. It hopes to reshape
itself into this lighter, more mobile, more connected, and more capable force in order to
achieve dominance in a wide range of scenarios. The great success that it achieved using
precision-guided munitions, stealth technology, and an overall superior technological
quality of force over the past ten years have reaffirmed the belief that technology is the
key force multiplier to achieve this dominance. Increasingly, doctrines seem to be
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focusing more on the US's vast techno-superiority, or rather the use of that technology, as
quickly as civilians have begun to integrate more technology into their lives. The single
most influential technology has been Information Technology (IT).
The military has also taken note of this. It is widely believed that an information
Revolution of Military Affairs (iRMA), placing information as center of gravity, has
occurred.I The military's Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 states that the fundamental aspects of
future warfare will be Information Dominance, knowing more than one's enemy, and
Decision Dominance, using information better and faster than one's enemy. The way in
which the military is trying to achieve these dominances is to have a far-reaching, robust,
ubiquitous Intelligence, Sensor, Reconnaissance (ISR) and telecommunications network,
as well as a network-centered fighting doctrine.2 Millions of dollars have been and are
being spent on creating the technologies, systems, and networks necessary for this
endeavor.
The iRMA, however, has not only drawn the military into the Information Age
with promises of an all-seeing, all-knowing, and deadly force. Because the iRMA places
information as a key center from which strength can be drawn, the iRMA has also made
information a critical target. From this dual nature of information, the revolution has also
brought about Information Warfare, a warfare that seeks to protect and destroy
information,.
This dual-edged nature of the iRMA should evoke some circumspection about the
military's IT systems' vulnerabilities to Information Warfare attacks. The US military has
already grasped many of the ideas behind Information Warfare as evidenced by the
electronic, cyber, and physical strikes on Iraqi C3 (command, control, communications)
links in the First Gulf War. Though the US is considered the world leader in incorporating
iRMA technologies and doctrines, it is questionable whether the military fully
The term information Revolution in Military Affairs (iRMA) is one of the author's convenience and not
official terminology.
2 Network Centric Warfare, http://www.dod.mil/nii/NCW/.
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understands the complex and costly implications of IW and net-centricity. Treatment of
the telecommunications systems needed to disseminate information, or the lack thereof, is
of significant concern. Of the many systems there are, SATCOM are especially significant.
As the US military becomes more thoroughly transformed, soldiers and commanders will
begin to depend more on highly mobile, remotely accessible, low to high data rate
communications to maintain connectivity and awareness. This type of communication can
only be facilitated by satellite systems. Though the military's current use of high data rate
systems is not as pervasive as it will become or is as widely used as lower data rate
systems, reports already exist addressing the bandwidth shortfall between the current
military satellite systems' supply and the enormous demand. Some reports indicate that
that military satellite communications (MILSATCOM), which are military-dedicated
systems, can only provide approximately 14% of the military's bandwidth needs.3 The
difference must be made by using commercially leased satellite transponders which are
not as secure. This shortfall of supply, the growing need for more, and the dependency on
information has made satellite systems, especially those which are unsecure, an
increasingly choice target to anyone who wishes to disrupt them.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) too has become aware of the iRMA and the
vulnerabilities associated with it. The PRC has been forecast as the United States' most
likely near-term competitor, but questions remain as to when and in what form it will
appear as a threat. Though the PRC is rapidly growing more politically, economically, and
militarily influential on a global scale, it has not yet transformed into the powerful state
its neighbors and the US fear it will. Several issues impede Chinese progress and will
continue to do so unless measures are taken to reform rigid sociopolitical policies and
implement better education and industrial practices. In light of its shortcomings, the PRC
refuses to remain toothless during its time of transition.
3 Tim Bonds, Michael Mattock, Thomas Hamilton, et al. Employing Commercial Satellite Communications:
Wideband Investment Options for DoD (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 2000), pg 8.
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Over the past three decades, the PRC has attempted to "catch up" to the modern
world in terms of its warfighting capabilities with large steps. Through changes in its
forces and command structures to changes in what it perceives as its threats as well as the
strategies needed to meet them, the PRC has been almost constantly rearranging itself to
take on the challenges of the modern battlefield. Through close observation of the First
Gulf War, the Balkan conflicts, and US military discussions, the PRC has focused itself on
preparing for the new, informationalized battlescape and fighting Information Warfare in
its most recent iteration.
Belief in the iRMA and the advent of Information Warfare places the PRC in an
interesting situation. The information infused military technology, equipment, and
doctrines needed to take full advantage of the iRMA are currently more advanced than
the PRC can produce and implement. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is equipped
with Cold War era vehicles and weapons, and its defense and private technology
industries lack the organization and strength to change this quickly. However,
Information Warfare presents many means of viably corrupting, disrupting, or destroying
information of one's enemies. Military information technologies and doctrines can be
complex and costly, but parallel civilian forms of IT can be cheap, user-friendly, and "soft"
forms of IW can be easily accessible.4 Thus, by equipping oneself with the IT and skill sets
that are becoming increasingly more available, one could asymmetrically affect the
information usage of an adversary without the need for developing the joint- and
precision-based doctrines often associated with the iRMA. This fact has not gone
unrecognized by the PLA.
Much of the work on IW discusses theory and when more practical tends to focus
on Computer Network Attack (CNA). This is not wholly surprising as IW is still a
relatively new concept and network/cyber war falls very stereotypically into the notion of
4 The PRC often views IW in "soft" and "hard" terms. Soft IW focuses on attacking information and its
dissemination while hard 1W focuses on attacking the physical systems through which information travels.
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warfare concerning information and IT. However, it is surprising that so little is being said
about the vulnerabilities that may be present in SATCOM systems, especially when they
are so vital to maintaining the flow of information.5 A report of the Space Commission,
which was specifically created to assess the US's space security, found that vulnerabilities
in SATCOM have been overlooked and understudied. It also admonished the Intelligence
Community to better evaluate the technical abilities of other states to threaten SATCOM
considering the increasingly available high technology and not to disregard programs or
technologies that may appear to have improbable success. 6 Being that competitors are
embracing IW and understand the importance of communications, the dearth of analysis
and assessment on the military's SATCOM is frightening.
China is of specific importance in this regard. The PLA has produced a number of
articles and papers discussing not only the use of IW asymmetric attacks against a more
technologically advanced adversary, but also naming the US as its primary opponent.
China also has demonstrated some ability to engage in IW through various cyber-attacks
and has recognized the importance of communications as evidenced by publications and
its own focus on developing a C3I (C3, intelligence) network. 7 China is also growing
rapidly, developing technologically, and sits across from the US in the tenuous Taiwan
situation. Furthermore, scholars and analysts in the US also believe that China is the US's
greatest near-term competitor. This all suggests that China should be carefully considered
as a real IW threat.
5 Bonds, Mattock, Hamilton, et al. Employing Commercial Satellite Communications. Like this report, many
articles discuss the US military's dependency on SATCOM and SATCOM systems' vulnerability. However,
they do not seem to make the logical step that a dependency on a vulnerable system is problematic, nor do
they try to evaluate this problem.
6 Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and Organization, Report of the
Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and Organization (Washington, D.C.: Jan 11,
2001), pg 18.
7 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China 's Military (University of California Press, 2002) pg 72-73, 89. The
First Gulf War revealed to the Chinese the importance of C2, SATCOM, and communications in general to
modern warfare.
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To evaluate the US vulnerabilities and Chinese threats, the remainder of the thesis
is segmented into three main chapters. The second chapter evaluates the vulnerabilities
that exist in the military's use of SATCOM. It does so by briefly explaining aspects of
satellite communications and IW that would be applicable, and then cataloguing the
SATCOM systems used and their associated vulnerabilities.
The third chapter assesses the PRC's ability to threaten SATCOM by delving into
what the PRC believes about IW, how developed their knowledge-base, doctrines, and
industry are to prosecute IW against SATCOM. After this is done, the PRC's potential
threat is scored against the aspects of IW that would be of use against SATCOM.
To make sense of two seemingly disjoint analyses, the fourth chapter offers a
qualitative example of the effect of a PRC attack on the military's SATCOM by analyzing
what may happen in a Taiwan crisis. Because it is impossible to know the exact outcome
of such a crisis, the analysis will judge the threat level China poses in both a non-
escalatory and escalatory US-PRC engagement.
Without the complete knowledge of what the PRC truly has planned and is
capable of or a deep understanding of how the US military uses SATCOM, the
implications and conclusions of this thesis are of a tentative nature. However, this does
not imply that they are any less substantial. Having assessed and compared the US
military's SATCOM vulnerabilities, and China's IW capabilities this thesis concludes that
China does indeed pose a moderate IW threat to SATCOM. This finding not only
expresses a need to reevaluate the use, structure, and safety of SATCOM systems for
today's soldiers, but also suggests that if left unaddressed these vulnerabilities may
jeopardize the very function of our future forces.
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Chapter 2
Measuring Vulnerabilities
Vulnerability must first be measured before threat can be evaluated. As we
continue to step further into the Information Era, the wide spectrum of Information
Warfare will undoubtedly create more cause for concern for every aspect of our society.
Our security forces have already begun to feel its effects and will continue to do so. As it
stands, the military's use of SATCOM is vulnerable. Though SATCOM has inherent
qualities protecting it against many forms of Electronic Attack, it is still susceptible to
simple variants of uplink noise jamming, such as continuous wave jamming and power
stealing. Military-dedicated systems offer some security, but the lack of bandwidth they
provide forces the military to use much less secure commercial systems. This problem will
only be exacerbated by the military's rapidly increasing bandwidth demand and its
predicted inability to provide a secure supply.
In order to measure vulnerability one must have some understanding of the nature
of satellite communications, how they are used, and from where vulnerabilities may arise.
To aid in this understanding, this chapter contains five sections. The first briefly
overviews some key ideas and concepts in satellite communications; the second highlights
the current thought and use of satellite communications, as well as implications for its
future; the third defines Information Warfare and vulnerabilities that satellite
communications may face; the fourth details current systems, uses, and vulnerabilities; the
fifth summarizes the chapter's findings.
Satellite Communications Primer
Because the topic being discussed is technical, some terms and concepts should first
be defined and explained. The explanations here are not very rigorous as the intent of this
18
section is to only give the reader a general understanding. For further depth, consult the
references.
Radio Communications
Electromagnetic waves propagate throughout the universe and in different forms.
Some common forms are visible light, infrared light, and microwaves, but these are just a
few. Each form has a set place on the electromagnetic spectrum, consists of a specific
number of electromagnetic frequencies, and contains its own spectrum. Visible light is a
good example of this. Humans cannot see electromagnetic frequencies below and above
the visible light spectrum, but we can identify different frequencies within the visible
light spectrum. We recognize these differences as color.
Radio waves are also a type of electromagnetic propagation and, like light, exist
within a specific set of frequencies and have a spectrum of its own. The radio spectrum is
split into several different frequency ranges called bands. Each band contains a set number
of frequencies that make up that band's bandwidth. The bandwidth of each band increases
as the radio spectrum gets closer to the visible light spectrum, which is higher in
frequency. Several of these radio frequency (RF) bands are used for telecommunications.
The military uses a number of RF bands, from Low Frequency (LF) to Extremely
High Frequency (EHF). However, because the frequencies differ in nature, there are three
reasons why they cannot all be used for the same purposes.
Table 1 - Radio Frequency Bands and Primary Propagation Types8
RF Band Frequencies Propagation Types Uses
Radio Navigation,
Vereey (VLow 3-30 kHz Ground Wave Long Distance
Frequency (VLF) Communications
Low Frequency 30-300 kHz Ground Wave Radio Navigation,
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8 Adapted from National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf; accessed July 11, 2005.
(LF) Medium Distance
Communications
Radio Navigation,
Medium Frequency Ground Wave, Sky AM Broadcasting,
(MF) Wave Medium Distance
Communications
Long Distance
High Frequency Ground Wave, Sky Communications,
(HF) Wave Short Wave
Broadcasting
Very High Scatter, Line of Long Distance
Frequency (VHF) Sight (LOS) Communications
Ultra High 300-3000 MHz Scatter, LOS Short Distance
Frequency (UHF) Communications
Super High Short Distance
Frequency (SHF) Communications
Extremely High Short Distance
Frequency (EHF) Communications
Table 2 - Microwave (100 MHz - 300 GHz) Band Designations9
Name Frequency Band
L 400 MHz- 1.5 GHz
S 1.5 - 5 GHz
C 4 - 6 GHz
X 5 - 10 GHz
K 10 - 36 GHz
Ku 15 - 17 GHz
Ka 33 - 36 GHz
Firstly, in order to efficiently receive radio signals an antenna's length should be
sized in relation to the signal's wavelength. Two important characteristics of
electromagnetic waves, frequency and wavelength, are inversely proportional to each
9 Adapted from National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf and John Neuhaus,
http://www.jneuhaus.com/fccindex/letter.html (August 27, 1999); accessed July 11, 2005.
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other by the speed of light.' ° Therefore, the lower a radio frequency is, the longer its
wavelength. For example, the frequency 104.1 MHz, belonging to the frequency band
used for broadcast radio, has a wavelength of 2.88 meters. An antenna smaller than the
wavelength of its intended signal can pick up the radio signal, but it depreciates the
signal's strength. Sizing the antenna according to the harmonic modes of the signal's
wavelength is one way of making smaller antennas without tremendously affecting the
antenna's reception strength. Antennas which are larger than necessary are often better
because they can capture more RF energy, making the signal stronger. However, large
antennas can be unwieldy. Thus, the size of a frequency's wavelength, and therefore its
matching antenna size, is one factor that dictates how useful it is to a user.
Secondly, the size of a frequency's wavelength affects how it propagates. The
molecular qualities of the media through which radio waves travel can alter their
propagation. Much like light interacting with water, ionized air molecules, the Earth,
man-made structures, and other forms of matter can reflect, diffract, scatter, and absorb
radio waves. This fact is observable in Table 1. Notice how the propagation type changes
with the band. For example, some bands, such as HF and VHF, can be carried or reflected
by ionized portions of the atmosphere allowing transmissions to travel long distances.
Others, such as SHF and EHF, can penetrate those same portions of the atmosphere and so
cannot take advantage of those effects. Therefore, wavelength can then determine what
frequency band is used in a given situation.
Thirdly, the amount of information that can be transmitted by a radio signal is
directly related to the frequency it is carried on, be it voice, images, data, etc. Digital
information is transmitted in binary elements called bits that electronic devices can
manipulate. Each bit represents an on or an off state, much like how Morse Code has
dashes and dots. Because frequency is measured in cycles per second or Hertz (Hz), 1 Hz
can maximally transfer 2 bits per second, e.g. a light switch going from off to on to off.
10 f = c/w Where f is frequency, c is the speed of light, and w is wavelength.
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Bandwidth is often also used to describe the size of information throughput because the
bit transfer rate over radio waves is proportional to the number of frequencies used.
Radio communication is conceptually very simply, but can be complex in its
implementation. All the equipment that is necessary to communicate over radio waves is a
transmitter, a receiver, and two antennas. In fact, the transmitters and receivers are quite
similar with the only difference being that one has electronic components to create radio
waves while the other uses similar components to interpret them. The creation a radio
wave can be quite simple. Because of the nature of electricity and magnetism, changes in
an electrical field will induce the creation of a magnetic field, which will induce another
electric field and so on. This is how electromagnetic waves propagate. Therefore, anytime
an electric field is created or oscillated, e.g. turning on an appliance or dimming a light,
radio waves can be produced. What determines if the electromagnetic waves that are
created are radio waves is the length of conductive material that is being electrically
charged. If radio waves are created then that length of material, which can be an ordinary
wire, is known as an antenna.
The antennas used in radio communication can be, but do not have to be, identical
in shape and size. However, they do have to be placed within each other's eradiation
patterns in order to transmit and receive signals. Because the power of a transmission
decreases with distance, a radio's eradiation pattern, created by the direction and strength
of a radio's transmissions, has limit in a practical sense." The design and shape of an
antenna influences the pattern. Most antennas one sees are omni-directional antennas,
meaning their radiation is emitted in all directions. Directional antennas focus their
radiation into a beam with some azimuth, much like a spot light. Omni-directional
antennas are very functional because a receiver can be placed in almost any position
around the transmitter and receive a signal and visa-versa. Though directional antennas
1 While radiation may go on forever, the signal will eventually be engulfed by noise.
22
must be pointed at each other in order to communicate, they are more efficient than
omni-directional antennas and can communicate at longer distances.
While radio waves can be produced by turning on a light, the amount of
information that can be transmitted by doing so is very limited. To make better use of the
medium, transmitters are constructed from electronic components that allow more
control of the radio wave pattern, which is the way in which information is carried. An
example of this is FM radio. The music or voice that is carried over FM waves is produced
by modulating, or changing, the frequency of the wave, much like using dashes and dots
in Morse Code. This and other forms of modulation can be accomplished by engineering
circuit boards made from rudimentary electronic components.
Transmitting information over radio waves is affected by many properties such as
distance between the transmitter and receiver, power of the transmission, how well the
antennas used propagate the signal properties, internal and external electrical and
conditions, thermal conditions, the presence of other radio waves, signal coverage, etc.
Because of these factors determine how well radio communication works may be difficult.
However, perhaps one of the most valuable metrics for evaluating radio communication is
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) which takes into account many, if not all, of the important
variables. The SNR measures the effective signal strength to the surrounding noise
strength and is measured in decibels (dB), making a more positive value favor the
legitimate signal. 12
The SNR is very important because it affects the amount of information that can be
communicated. For instance, in digital communication, a SNR of OdB can generate a bit
error rate (BER) high enough to preclude the reception of intelligible information.' 3
12 Richard Poisel, Introduction to Communication Electronic Warfare Systems (Boston, MA: Artech House,
2002), pg 55-60. While signal strength is determined by antenna efficiencies, transmission power, distances,
and so on, noise can be produced from a number of naturally occurring sources including thermal
conditions, external and internal electrical conditions, and interference from other legitimate signals and
reflections of the same signal.
13 Ibid., pg 506. BER is the rate at which bits are corrupted and can be influenced by natural phenomena.
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Another example is that 6dB is often viewed as the threshold SNR for differentiating
between the desired signals and other spurious signals.'4
In truth, while radio communication can be as simple as described, it can also be
quite complex depending on the information being sent, the location sending to and from,
the frequency band used, and a host of other factors.
Satellite Communications
There are two major advantages that satellite communications have over terrestrial
wireless communications. First, for terrestrial wireless networks to be useful over large
distances, transmission repeaters must be constructed to boost radio signals because radio
transmissions lose power in relation to the distance over which they travel. This can be
problematic for expeditionary forces who might be deployed far from friendly terrestrial
repeaters, for places with rough terrain, and terrain where repeaters can be impractical
e.g. oceans. Placing repeaters atop towers and mountains can extend the coverage area,
but it is not a perfect solution. Because a satellite is a repeater in orbit hundreds of
thousands of feet above the Earth's surface, it can cover wide expanses, some roughly a
third of the Earth's surface. A satellite network, consisting of several satellites and ground
stations, which can complete any gaps in the satellites' coverage by repeating message to
other satellites, can be accessible to forces on a global scale, making sure they are always
within communications contact.
Second, line of sight is best for making radio connections. However, this is usually
not obtainable because of man-made and natural obstacles, as well as the curvature of the
Earth. May forms of RF communication do not require line of sight (LOS) for maintaining
links because they can take advantage of other effects, such as scatter, or can permeate
some obstructions. Unfortunately, the higher data rate information flow which is
becoming more important for military communications cannot be carried over these
24
14 Ibid., 55-60.
bands, but must use microwave bands. Unlike lower frequency bands, microwave bands
require LOS connections because obstruction affects them much more and they cannot
take advantage of the same propagation effects lower bands can. Placing repeaters as high
as possible is also the usual remedy for obtaining LOS communications, but this too is not
perfect. Again, because satellites are in orbit far above the Earth's surface, they can offer
reliable LOS communication to anyone who can "see" them.
Satellite communications have been used by the military for several decades. The
majority of communications satellites orbit the Earth geosynchronously, meaning that
their orbital period is or about 24 hours, though some are in low (LEO) and medium
(MEO) Earth orbits.15 In order to orbit geosynchronously, the satellites have to maintain
an altitude of about 22,000 km above the equator. At this altitude, equatorial satellites can
see roughly one third of the Earth's surface, save the Polar Regions. The directional
antennas that satellites use focus the radio waves that eradiate into a beam, much like a
spot light. This beam is called the main lobe, because other beams extending out of the
sides of the main lobe can also be produced naturally. These are called side lobes and are
not usually considered beneficial as they can increase the vulnerability of the satellite.
This will be discussed further below. Communications satellites can focus their coverage
into narrow spot beams, wider area beams, and finally Earth beams capable of servicing
one-third of the Earth. Thus, only three satellites and either three ground relays or cross-
links between each other, are needed to enable users to "hop" transmissions over expanses
that ground relays could not, such as oceans, to almost any point in the world..
Maintaining a position in geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) gives satellites a
stationary location relative to the surface over which they orbit. Because LEO and MEO
satellites must sustain a higher velocity to counterbalance the Earth's gravity, their orbits
are much faster than a GEO satellite. This means that contact with a GEO satellite can be
15 Bonds, Mattock, Hamilton, et. al., Employing Commercial Satellite Communications, pg 14.
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maintained without having to track it as much as with lower orbiting satellites, and
ground repeaters. 16
In these ways, satellites act as repeater platforms extending users transmissions
beyond the line of sight and around the world. Their wide coverage and ability to utilize
higher bandwidth microwaves can create a global network well suited for mobile, remote,
and information hungry users.
The military needs to be able to communicate to a variety of forces, in a number of
location types, and with differing amounts of information. To optimize information flow,
the military changes the way in which it communicates across the spectrum of its needs.
The VHF and UHF bands are used as the main means of wireless telecommunications for
the military because the equipment necessary is relatively mobile, cheap, and often used
in an omni-directional fashion. 7 However, VHF/UHF communications cannot transfer
the increasingly large amounts of information, or offer the great deal of security that the
military needs.
While the VHF and UHF bands can theoretically transfer 540 megabits per sec
(Mbps) and 5.4 gigabits per second (Gbps) respectively, there are two reasons why more
bandwidth is needed. RF bands are channelized, meaning that they are split up into
smaller sub-bands, so that multiple users can take advantage of each RF band. If two users
were trying to send signals using the same frequency, the signals would interfere, possibly
16 Lower Earth orbit satellites can utilize omni-directional antennas better than GEO satellites because of the
distance and so tracking the satellite to maintain connection is not always necessary. Some lower earth orbit
satellites circle in high elliptical orbits. This also does not require the ground receivers to track them because
they orbit in such a way that they cover one portion of the Earth longer than the rest, and as one satellite
falls out of view another comes into view. Therefore the connection is maintained. This method, however,
does not allow very good global coverage.
17 Omni-directional systems, which eradiate and absorb RF energy from all directions, are useful for
transmitting and receiving signals from various positions without having to steer the antennas. This also
makes it easier for jammers to attack such systems because they are not restricted by positioning. Omni-
directional systems also tend to have lower signal strengths because the signals are not focused. This too
facilitates jammers as it does not require them to emit at very high powers.
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causing the signals to nullify each other. The second reason is that, even in a channelized
environment, radio signals can interact with other frequencies and the media they travel
in such a way that error-correction information must be sent along with an RF signal to
ensure that it is accurately received. In military radio communications, still more error-
correction is added to defend against enemy efforts to receive and/or disrupt
communications. This will be discussed in more length in the third section. After
channelization, error-correction, and anti-jamming techniques are accounted for, typical
information bandwidth for UHF channel is below 64 kbps.
Information transferred lower than 64 kbps is considered narrowband
communication, while information transferred at a rate above 64 kbps is considered
wideband communication. Voice, teletype, and simple forms of digital data are narrow
enough not to require wideband links and make up the bulk of satellite communications.
However, more sophisticated information used for collaborative planning, video
teleconferencing, video telemedicine, imagery distribution, video tele-training, as well as
remote maintenance/ technical assistance and distribution of situational awareness cannot
be passed across narrowband links. 18 Neither VHF nor UHF offers the bandwidth
necessary for these wideband communications. Higher bandwidth can be obtained by
using the higher, SHF and EHF, frequency bands. As much as 1.544 Mbps can be
transferred over some secure EHF links. Unlike VHF and UHF, SHF and EHF bands
require the transmitting and receiving antenna to be within LOS. Ground relays do exist,
but because of the advantages explained above, satellites are the main relays for these
bands.
SHF and EHF also require much smaller antennas because of their wavelength. For
example, the wavelength of 30 GHz is only cm. Because of this, SHF and EHF
18 Department of the Navy, NTP2 Section 1 (D) Naval Telecommunications Procedures. Navy Super High
Frequency Satellite Communications (Dahlgren, VA: Naval Space Command, 1997), pg 9. Found at
Federation of America Scientists, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/navy/ntp2/front.htm accessed
August 2, 2005.
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transmissions can be made highly directional with much smaller antennas, allowing such
transmissions to have Low Probability of Interception (LPI) and Low Probability of
Detection (LPD). In other words, it makes it harder for adversaries to listen in on
transmissions or discover where they are being sent to and from. Microwave transmissions
are not without drawbacks, however. Bandwidth can also be affected by the power of the
transmission and the receive/transmit antennas used just as any other RF transmission."
Microwave frequencies can also be attenuated by foliage and precipitation and reflected
by man-made structures more easily than lower frequency bands.
Digital Need
Military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) has been in use since the 1960'.2 °
MILSATCOM was mainly used for narrowband, voice or teletype communications. These
systems included the Navy's Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) system, the
Air Force's Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM) system, the Department of
Defense's Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), and the Military Strategic
and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) system. However, the use of SATCOM has increased
considerably since the iRMA began in the early 1990's. The iRMA had two impacts on the
military's use of SATCOM systems. First, the iRMA's focus on information and technology
allowed for doctrines and practices that required larger amounts of information. This
increased information demand stressed the MILSATCOM systems by requiring them to
support types or amounts of information for which they were not designed. Second, the
iRMA's mirroring of the information boom in the civilian world led the military to
believe that it had the information capacity civilians enjoyed. 21 However, the systems and
requirements the military had for telecommunications did not support this belief. By
19 Bonds, Mattock, Hamilton, et. al., Employing Commercial Satellite Communications, pg 14
20 The difference between what the military uses for SATCOM and MILSATCOM is that MILSATCOM does
not account for the commercially leased satellite transponders the military uses.
21 The CBO, The Armys Bandwidth Bottleneck (August 2003), pg ix.
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simply not being able to maintain the new communications links, commercial satellites,
first augmenting the MILSATCOM systems in the early 1990's, began to take on a larger
role as the military's SATCOM provider.2 2
Over the past decade SATCOM needs rose roughly an order of magnitude from
hundreds of Mbps to single Gbps and it is projected to increase by another order of
magnitude in ten years.23 The bandwidth supply of MILSATCOM has not been able to
keep up with this trend nor is it believed that it will be able to. Since the early 1990's,
commercial satellites (COMERSAT) has been providing an increasing percentage of the
military's SATCOM supply. In the First Gulf War some 100 Mbps were supplied through
COMERSAT while in Operation Iraqi Freedom 2.4 Gbps were from COMERSAT,
accounting for 84% of satellite communications.24 The future looks no brighter for
MILSATCOM as it is predicted it will only be able to supply some 4 Gbps while the need
could skyrocket to more than 14 Gbps in the next decade.25
Each service has been affected differently by this shortfall as they each use
SATCOM in different ways and to different measures. In the past SATCOM was used for
narrowband, long-haul communications from units in the field to command units across
distances where lines could not be established including communication to commands in
the continental US (CONUS). It was and is also used as a global platform to disseminate
Emergency Action Messages to strategic forces. Because of the iRMA, however,
22 Patrick Chisholm, "Buying Time: Disconnects in Satcom Procurement," (Military Information
Technology, Nov. 29, 2003) http://www.military-information-technology.conVm/article.cfm?DocID=285.
Commercial satellites were first used to supplement MILSATCOM by taking on the maintenance of non-
weapons critical links.
23 Ibid.; David Ehrhard, Major, USAF, "Standing in the Strategic Bandwidth Gap: A View of Military
Communications in 2010," (Air and Space Power Chronicles, March 9, 2004)
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/ehrhard.html; Bonds, Mattock, Hamilton, et. al.,
Employing Commercial Satellite Communications, pg 10.
24 Chisholm, "Buying Time"; The CBO, The Army's Bandwidth Bottleneck (August 2003), pg 16. Though
this number does not reveal COMERSAT usage by branch, it can be used to indicate the overall reliance on
COMERSAT.
25 Chisholm, "Buying Time"; Erhhard, "Standing in the Strategic Bandwidth Gap,"; Bonds, Mattock,
Hamilton, et. al., Employing Commercial Satellite Communications, pg 10.
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communications now take on a much wider variety of forms and require wider
bandwidths than they once did. Present communications can be anywhere between
sharing situational awareness data between commands in mobile units to video-
telemedicine between medical units and counterparts in CONUS. Stationary bases in each
service have the benefit of being able to be linked with fiber optic cable or other landlines
facilitating the increasingly large volumes of information to flow. Mobile commands do
not share this luxury and depend on the higher data rates of SATCOM when a line
connection cannot be made. This dependence is only growing as mobility, jointness, and
net-centricity are new ideal qualities of the military.
The US Air Force uses SATCOM to provide C2 communications, Emergency
Action Message dissemination, force direction and reporting, communications between
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander in Chief, as well as some operational planning,
crisis operations, exercise support, and technical training.26 It has also identified that its
SATCOM usage has become critical to its functioning and its needs are greater than its
supply. 7 The Air Force uses all of the MILSATCOM systems, as well as some commercial
systems. 2 8
Of the services the US Navy is probably the most dependent on SATCOM because
the terrain over which its fights does not permit landlines or always facilitate LOS
communications. It also uses all of the MILSATCOM systems and is dependent on
commercial satellites systems to fill their bandwidth gaps. The Navy uses SATCOM for
everything from low data rate text and voice for tactical communications to higher data
26 Federation of American Scientist, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/army/fm24-11/Ch7.htm#ch7.
27 Spacedaily, "Northrop Grumman Delivers 16th Joint STARS Aircraft To Air Force," (March 8, 2004)
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-comms-041.html; Lt. Dennis French Jr., "AF SATCOM:
Communicators leverage future technology," http://public.afca.af.mil/Intercom/2004/APR/040402.html.
28 Dr. James G. Roche, "Integrating Space Into Joint Warfighting: Continuing the March," (Find Articles,
July 14, 2003) http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOPDU/is_2003July-_4/ai-109569821/pg2.
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rate logistics and operational planning, as well as video conferencing and long-haul
communications to the continental US.29
Though the actual bandwidth needs and shortfalls in each branch may not be
publicly available, a study performed by the Congressional Budget Office evaluating the
US Army's bandwidth shortfall can highlight the disparity between what information
throughputs the military expects and what it has available. During Operation Iraqi
Freedom, units of the Army's 5th Corps, the Marine's 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, and
a British armor division were equipped with components of the digital communications
architecture used by the fully digitized 4th Infantry Division. This system was called Blue
Force Tracker.30 While the system was considered successful, it was often overloaded with
information.
While the forces were only about 25-33% digitized, the Congressional Budget
Office estimated that even fully digitized units would have an average supply bandwidth
shortfall of about 82.5-86.7% of demand at peak usage considering all command levels.31
All command levels had line-of-sight (LOS) communications systems, but only commands
at the brigade level and above had access to MILSATCOM for beyond-line-of-sight
(BLOS) links. This became problematic as the fast paced nature of the conflict revealed
that LOS communications were not adequate to maintain communications links between
certain units. To bridge the gap, units began to use available commercial satellite channels
in the form of email and chat-rooms to pass information. The figures above and the action
taken by the units on the ground highlight two major issues. The first is that the current
LOS communications offered by ground relay is not sufficient for fast-paced combat, or
situations where land-based LOS communications break down. The second is that the
29 Globalsecurity, "Executive Summary of Commercial Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Report,"
http://www. fas.org/spp/military/docops/navy/commrept/index.html.
30 The CBO, The Army's Bandwidth Bottleneck, pg 15.
31 Ibid., pg 16.
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Army could not offer MILSATCOM to its forces because it did not anticipate its
bandwidth needs.
As informationalization under Transformation continues, the need for greater
amounts of bandwidth will become increasingly unmanageable, especially as wideband
communications which depends on the high bandwidth, becomes more predominant. The
more mobile, survivable, and lethal Objective Force is slated to enter service in 2008 with
the Future Combat System.3 2 The Future Combat System (FCS) is labeled as a "system of
systems" working together to increase the effectiveness of the soldier. Soldiers will be able
to receive video confirmation of local enemies through links to squad-commanded
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Commanders will be able to use a better economy of
force by having a well-developed "picture" of where his/her and enemy units are.
Autonomous networked artillery and multiple rocket launchers (MRLS) systems will be
able to accurately bring firepower to bear beyond the line of sight. Though this is only a
partial listing of what the FCS will offer, it is obvious that the crux of the FCS is
information technology, and information itself, the heart of the military's new way of
war.
The bandwidth needs of an FCS equipped unit will be enormous. Given the
example of OIF, and that the Objective Force is attempting to create smaller, more mobile,
and more informed units, it is hard to believe that SATCOM will not be the means of
choice to sustain communications links. MILSATCOM, however, is not predicted to have
the bandwidth capacity necessary, even with the new systems being launched.33 The CBO
also predicts there will not be a large surplus of bandwidth in any of the communications
systems when digitization will be better integrated in 2010. 34 This suggests that
32 The Objective Force is the form into which the military hopes to transform. It stresses mobility, rapid
deployment, and lethality, to name a few qualities. The Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, a stepping stone to
the Objective Force, are an example of this evolution as they trade heavily armored divisions for lighter yet
more mobile brigades.
33 Bonds, Mattock, Hamilton, et. al., Employing Commercial Satellite Communications, pg 10.
34 The CBO, The Army's Bandwidth Bottleneck, pg 23.
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commercial satellites will continue to play a large, if not increasing, role in enabling our
forces to stay connected.
Information Warfare
Information Operations (IO) can best be described as offensive or defensive action
taken to control information. Information Warfare (IW) is best described as IO conducted
during times of crisis or military conflict.35 IW is a warfare fought on the battlefields, on
the seas, in the air, in outer-space and cyberspace, in the media and in the mind.
Information Warfare can be as simple as hiding a piece of artillery with camouflage and as
complicated as creating a national intelligence network capable of surviving attacks on
independent nodes. IO campaigns can also take place before, during, or independently of
military conflict. For these reason, IO and IW cover a wide spectrum of attacks and
defenses that can affect every aspect of a nation using and/or depending on information.
IW theory currently defines six aspects of Information Warfare often called the
"Six Pillars of IW".36 The six include: Computer Network Attack (CNA), Electronic
Warfare (EW), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Deception, Physical Destruction, and
Operations Security (OPSEC). Command and Control Warfare (C2W) is a subset of IW
that includes all the Pillars save CNA.37 C2W is directly related to military action aimed at
decapitating an adversary's military. Because of this C2W is often the focus of IW with
relation to military action. There are two forms of decapitation attacks both of which are
designed to sever the decision-making components of a force from its decision-enacting
35 D. Curtis Schleher, Electronic Warfare in the Information Age (Norwood, MA: ARTECH HOUSE, INC.,
1999), pg 3-5; Leigh Armistead ed., Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, c2004), pg 212. The discussion of IO in this book is quite theoretic and states
that IO's main focus is "perception management"; DoD Dictionary of Military Terms.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/i/. Of the many authors that discuss IW, most use the
terminology sanctioned by the military.
36 Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Information Warfare: A Phantom Menace or Emerging Threat?(SSI, Nov. 2001)
pg 4.
37 C2W does use CNA though it is often thought of as enabling other aspects of C2W and has no value onto
itself.
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components: anti-head and anti-neck. Anti-head attacks are directed at striking
commanders and leaders themselves, while anti-neck attacks are directed at severing the
channels through which decisions flow from commands.38 Anti-neck attacks are the most
prevalent form of C2W simply because technology allows commands to remain far away
from the frontlines.3 9
Each form of C2W affects the information infrastructure of a military in different,
but synergistic ways.40 OPSEC is the enactment of procedures and guidelines that control
the spread of vital information in order to maintain a superiority of knowledge. EW is
military action taken to control the electromagnetic spectrum. PSYOPS are actions that
are focused on depleting an enemy's morale and causing confusion. Deception is
deliberately giving or allowing the enemy to have false information which will allow
advantages to accrue to the deceiver. Physical Destruction is attacks on the information
infrastructure itself. OPSEC, PSYOPS, and Deception are all aimed at controlling
information itself, while EW and Physical Destruction are aimed at affecting the medium
and technology through which information travels.
SATCOM is made of three segments, attacking any of which using 1W could affect
its use: the ground segment, the satellite segment, and radio transmission segment. The
ground segment is composed of track, telemetry, and control (TT&C) stations, which
maintain the satellites' orbits, teleports, which receive satellite signals and relay them
using land lines and visa versa, hopping stations, which retransmit messages from one
satellite to another, and the user-end terminals. The satellite segment is the satellite, and
the radio transmission segment is the message.
This thesis focuses on the EW aspect of C2W for five reasons. Firstly, EW, Physical
Destruction, and possibly CNA seem the most threatening of the Six Pillars to the ground
38 Martin C. Libicki, What is Information Warfare?(Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Concepts and
Technology, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1995), pg 10-13.
39 Ibid. Operations in OIF are a good example of both forms of decapitation strikes.
40 D. Curtis Schleher, Electronic Warfare in the Information Age, pg 5.
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segments.4 ' In order to physically destroy components of the ground segment, control
stations, teleports, user-end terminals, etc. would have to be attacked. This could prove
difficult as many components are either within US territories, CONUS, allied nations, and
carried with armed forces. This may require the use of Special Forces, long range missiles,
and a willingness to attack international states that are not directly involved with the
conflict as well as facilities from which the attacker may benefit. Physical Destruction of
ground segments may also not prove to have more than temporary effect. Tracking,
Telemetry, and Control (TT&C) links to satellites can be reestablished at other facilities,
the use of hopping stations may be reshuffled, and the user-end terminals can be replaced.
While it is theoretically possible to use PSYOPS, Deception, and undermine
OPSEC using CNA at ground segments, military encryption is very sophisticated and it is
unlikely that it would be broken other than by an enemy of equal technological
capabilities which are few.42 CNA could be used to infect terminals with viruses, mine
satellite telemetry information, overload systems, and hypothetically, corrupt control
information so as to degrade satellite performance. However, CNA users would have to
penetrate network security, be knowledgeable of how such systems worked, and rely on
their victims to implement little to no active defense measures. This would be unlikely.
Electronic Warfare covers a wide variety of attacks including the use of directed-
energy weapons (DEW) and jamming. The technological requirements for EW are as
various as its forms. Some like DEW or microwave bombs necessitate high technologies
that are not yet fully developed, while others like jamming need only simple, purchasable
electronic components and knowledge of telecommunications because jamming is
41 CNA is considered here because it could affect some of the ground segment elements of SATCOM even
though it seems to take on a C2W support role in the literature.
42 Libicki, What is Information Warfare?, pg 30-31. Digital signal encryption is very difficult be brake. Even
with state of the art computers it may take impractical computation times to crack; Globalsecurity,
"Executive Summary of Commercial Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Report,"
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/navy/commrept/index.html. Spread Spectrum techniques such as
Frequency Hopping can also be considered a method of encryption in that the only device which can "read"
a frequency hopped message is one that already knows the pseudorandom scheme. Frequency hopped
message too can be deciphered, but it requires a very sophisticated device to do so.
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fundamentally the same as transmitting legitimate signals.43 Though Signals Intelligence
(SIGINT) may be necessary for jamming damage assessment, the technology needed to do
so is more likely to be fielded than the nuclear weapons needed for high altitude
electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) attacks or DEW with enough power and mobility to
threaten a large range of the SATCOM ground segment. Because jamming technologies
are more easily acquired they appear to be the most threatening form of EW. Jamming too
has its drawbacks in that the only way to jam a directional SATCOM ground segment,
which most of SATCOM is, is through using conspicuous means of downlink jamming.
This is described in more detail in a later section.
Second, the satellite segment is most vulnerable to Physical Destruction and EW.
Implementing physically destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks against a satellite
requires satellite tracking and missile launch capabilities.4 4 There are many methods of
employing ASAT, some as conceptually simple as intercepting a satellite with a ground
launched missile to the more complex method of attaching parasitic micro-satellites to a
target to destroy the satellite at a later time.4 5 In either case, while it is possible to track a
satellite rather easily using telescopes and laser range finding, launching a missile against a
satellite would be difficult to any but the few nations that have launch capabilities.4 6
Electronic Warfare against satellites is similar to that of EW against the ground
segment of SATCOM. The main differences are that uplink jamming, jamming the
satellite, must be used because downlink jamming, jamming a ground segment, does not
work against satellites and that satellite tracking technologies are also needed to properly
target satellites. Uplink jamming can be employed in a much more covert manner than
downlink jamming because a downlink jammer must be positioned in such a way to
43 Thomas Wilson, "Threats to the United States Space Capabilities, " Found at Federation of America
Scientists, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article05.html.
44 Wilson, "Threats".
45 Ibid.
46 Wilson suggests that non-state actors and states without launch capabilities could buy their way onto the
vehicle of a launch-capable state. This author agrees that such a possibility does exist.
36
mimic a satellite's directional transmission, though it too can be discovered through the
SIGINT campaigns of an adversary. Although, some SATCOM systems which use Earth
coverage beams, less directional beams, and neglect their side lobes may be threatened by
jammers far enough away from a conflict that it may be impractical or dangerous to seek
and destroy them.
Third, the radio transmission segment is an electromagnetic wave so only EW
would have a direct effect. OPSEC, PYSOPS, and Deception could theoretically take
advantage of the transmission, however, as mentioned before military encryption is very
difficult to break and because the LPI/LPD characteristics of directional transmission
make them hard to intercept. Nuclear weapons and microwave bombs could be used to
electronically disrupt a local area's atmosphere enough to degrade or corrupt transmission,
but these methods call for the use of weapons that are highly destructive and therefore
carry the weight of international retribution or highly sophisticated technology making
either of unlikely use.
Fourth, communications links are becoming the weak link in Intelligence, Sensor,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) networks because of the distances between the globally and
extra-globally dispersed sensors from processing centers which tend to be in CONUS.47
Lastly, while of the Six Pillars of IW, Physical Destruction, CNA, and simple forms of EW
appear to be the most threatening to SATCOM, the requirements needed for Physical
Destruction and CNA to affect any aspect of SATCOM are greater than those of the
equipment and competency for simple EW, which are becoming cheaper and more
widespread. This suggests that an EW threat is the most likely.
Electronic Warfare
Electronic Warfare is made of three components: Electronic Attack (EA);
Electronic Protection (EP); and Electronic Support (ES). Older roles such as electronic
47 Libicki, What is Information Warfare?, pg 30-31.
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countermeasures (ECM) and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) have been
recast with wider definitions giving way to more general terminology.
EA is not only concerned with jamming, but also concerns directed-energy
weapons (DEW), anti-radiation missiles (ARM), electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons,
and other attacks directed at destroying the electronics technology necessary for
warfare.48 EP includes protecting electronic equipment as well as the management of the
electromagnetic spectrum. ES is the electronic supporting action, e.g. target identification,
target acquisition, recognition of threats, which enable friendly forces to act and respond
correctly.4 9
Of the forms of EA, jamming is probably the most likely form an opposing force
would implement against SATCOM. Of the two jamming methods, noise and deception,
noise jamming is the easiest and of the two strategies, uplink and downlink jamming,
uplink is the least conspicuous. Therefore, uplink noise jamming will be the study of this
section because it would pose the most likely threat. Of the several jamming and anti-
jamming schemes that will be discussed, power stealing appears to be the most
threatening jamming scheme because it is simple and effective.
Directed-energy weapons and anti-radiation missiles are generally seen as weapons
for destroying physical elements such as cruise missiles and radar sites. While it is
theoretically possible to construct a directed-energy weapon that could knock out a
satellite, the power necessary to do so would make such an attempt highly prohibitive.5 0
The use of EMP weapons such as a nuclear detonation at high altitude or a microwave
pulse weapons are not unrealistic but could only be accomplished at severe international
risk or by a highly technological entity. Jamming is the simplest and to some extent safest
form of EA making it very appealing.
48 EA is linked to Physical Destruction because all of five subsets of C2W interact. Categorizations in C2W
are only for a simpler understanding of each synergistic element.
49 Schleher, Electronic Warfare in the Information Age.
50 Because of the distance between the Earth and a satellite in GEO a DEW would need power on the order
of megawatts to gigawatts, millions to billions of Watts, in order to be successful.
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To jam a transmission one only needs an antenna, a transmitter, a power source,
and a target. In its essence, a jammer is exactly the same as a transmitter and so the
equipment is also essentially the same. In fact, one could use legitimate signals to jam.5 '
The complexity of a jammer is dependent on the jamming scheme and the target's EP. For
example, to affect the usage of a certain frequency, a jammer would only need to be tuned
to that frequency and transmit at a power enough to compete with any legitimate signals.
Doing so increases the jamming-to-signal ratio (J/S) which is measured in decibels and is
essentially a receiver's SNR inverted.
Jammers can also be designed to meet various deployment needs. Some jammers
may require a considerable amount of power and so must be positioned near a sufficient
power sources or carry one if the jammer is to be mobile. Jammers can be as large and as
complex to necessitate its own facilities, or as small and as simple to require a backpack
and some batteries. The jammers needed for attack SATCOM could be fit to a ship, an
aircraft, or even a truck. Stationary jammers would also not require large facilities and
could be hidden in a civilian population.
Two general forms of jamming exist: noise jamming and deception jamming. In the
context of communications, noise jamming is the use of radio wave energy to disrupt or
distort the opposing force's ability to transfer useful information via radio wave by making
it difficult to "hear" useful signals. Deception jamming is the intentional use of radio wave
energy to deceive the opposing force's radio devices with false information. Each requires
the correct deployment strategy to be successful against opposition EP and visa-versa.
Deception jamming can be categorized into three schemes: Manipulation,
Simulation, and Imitation. Each scheme either can jam a communication system with
methods as complex as masquerading false signals as true signals or as simple as repeating
an opponent's old messages causing confusion. In any case, deception jamming can be
51 If you've ever tried to listen to a radio station, but couldn't hear it well because another station's
transmission was interfering, you've experienced RF jamming.
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quite difficult as it can require a deep understanding of an opponent's communication
structure, highly advanced encryption breaking devices, and even the use of an
opponent's equipment.52 For these reasons, this thesis will focus on the SATCOM
vulnerabilities to EA in the form of noise jamming which can be undertaken more easily
because it only seeks to disrupting messages. Thus, a vulnerability to noise jamming would
indicate a more likely threat to the communications network.53
With digital signals, jamming can be effective against both the frequency and the
synchronization of transmissions. Jamming affecting the frequency of a transmission seeks
to block out sections or the whole of a transmission's bandwidth with enough power that
messages become useless. In other words, it seeks to decrease the SNR of the target below
the threshold of intelligible communication. Jamming affecting synchronization seeks to
demodulate signals in such a way that they cannot be processed correctly.
SATCOM can be attacked at the satellite through uplink jams or at the user-end
terminal with downlink jams. Because of the nature of SATCOM, uplink jamming is
simpler and more effective than downlink jamming. Uplink jamming against a GEO
satellite targets a stationary platform, and if successful can cut off all of the connections
the satellite was making, thus disturbing a part if not all of the network. This, however, is
contingent on being able to locate the satellite. Because satellites use directional antennas,
a jammer must be positioned correctly as to interact with the main or side lobes of its
target, just as any transmitter would. This is not always an easy task because directionality
makes it difficult to find from where a satellite is receiving.
Downlink jamming has to be done from locations in between the satellite and the
terminal because satellite transmissions tend to be directional. This would not be
necessary for terminals that use omni-directional antennas. Airborne jammers would
52 Michael R. Frater, Electronic Warfare for the Digitized Battlefield (Boston, MA: Artech House, 2001), pg
157-162.
53 For the remainder of this work the word "jamming" should be understood as "noise jamming". However,
deception jamming, when done correctly, can also have many of the same effects as noise jamming.
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therefore be the most likely platform to downlink jam from. UAVs would be particularly
useful in this endeavor as they could be used expendably, flying directly over enemy
troops.54 In essence, the jammer would effectively be acting as a satellite itself. Downlink
jamming is possible and the techniques used are very similar to uplink jamming. However,
downlink jamming can be more challenging and conspicuous to implement than uplink
jamming, making it less effective in many cases. For these reasons, uplink noise jamming
will be the focus of this discussion.
There are several general methods of noise jamming: narrowband, wideband,
continuous wave (CW), and pulse jamming. These, however, are not without
countermeasures and there exist anti-jamming techniques that can be practiced, thus
giving way to the back-and-forth nature of EW. Anti-jamming (AJ) Electronic Protection
methods also come in various forms. EP measures can be taken with the antenna, the
transmitted message, and the frequencies it travels over. The military employs all three to
varying degrees of success.
Narrowband Jamming
Narrowband jamming focuses on a single frequency, called spot jamming, or small
number of frequencies, called combined jamming, and can be accomplished from stand-
off jamming, which is jamming at a distance from the target.55 Narrowband jamming is
also probably one of the easiest jamming schemes to implement. Focusing on a small
number of frequencies allows for more powerful jamming, but is not very effective at
disrupting high bandwidth transmissions. One set of techniques of anti-jamming
technique that work well against narrowband jamming is called Spread Spectrum (SS)
techniques. These techniques trade full bandwidth capacity for protection. The two most
common methods are frequency hopping and direct sequencing.
54 Poisel, Introduction to Communication Electronic Warfare Systems, pg 193-194.
55 Ibid., pg 190.
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Frequency Hopping is the most common Spread Spectrum technique. This
technique takes a small number of frequencies that transmit information and "hops" them
within a larger bandwidth. Hopping is usually done hundreds of times a second and
follows a pseudorandom order that both the transmitter and receiver know. Many of the
jamming methods described above don't fare well against a frequency hopped
transmission because they would only affect parts of the bandwidth.56
Direct Sequencing is much like encryption for the frequency itself. The true
information is merged with a higher bit rate signal that carries no information. The
merged signal is then transmitted and demodulated by the receiver which knows the
waveform of the "encryption" signal. By merging the true signal with a higher bit rate
signal, this technique adds bandwidth to the transmission so that jammers have a more
difficult time jamming the proper signal. Essentially, Direct Sequencing hides the true
signal in noise.
By employing either of these techniques, a narrowband jammer would find it
difficult, if not impossible, to focus on a small number of frequencies and remain effective.
However, how well a SS technique works is inherently tied to the amount of information
that needs to be passed and the amount of bandwidth it has available around which it can
spread its message. Thus, if not given enough bandwidth, SS technique can fail against
narrowband jamming.
Wideband Jamming
Wideband or barrage jamming is very similar to narrowband jamming except that
it attempts to blanket as much of the transmission bandwidth as possible for as long as
possible and is more successful then narrowband. However, because wideband jamming
affects multiple frequencies at once, it requires larger amounts of power than narrowband
56 Poisel, Introduction to Communication Electronic Warfare Systems, pg 202-203. In order to block a
frequency hopped transmission a follower jammer, which tracks the hops, can be employed. However, such
a device can be very complex and tracking would still be difficult.
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jamming which can be prohibitive because it attempts to jam more frequencies at once. It
is best attempted with stand-in jamming, jamming near the target, to compensate for its
power requirements.5 7
SS techniques are more susceptible to wideband jamming because wideband
jamming can affect a larger portion of the frequency band, thus whether either hopped or
sequenced the signal can potentially have more of its message jammed. Even so, because
wideband jamming requires a good deal of power and some band such as SHF and EHF are
quite wide, wideband jamming can still be effectively countered by SS techniques.
CWand Pulse Jamming
CW jamming does not focus on any one frequency but sweeps across the entire
bandwidth. This method requires less power than wideband jamming, but is more
effective than narrowband jamming. Pulse jamming is similar to wideband jamming but
transmits in pulses instead of continuously. This is also a way of jamming many
frequencies with less power requirements than wideband jamming. However, rapidly
switching from one frequency to another as CW and pulse jamming can require
necessitates complex equipment.
These forms of jamming can be effective against Frequency Hopping SS techniques
because they can cover larger amount of the bandwidth without requiring very high
amounts of power. Direct Sequencing SS can fare better against them because it spreads its
message it such a way that small frequency gaps are not as deleterious. Again, SS
techniques can counter these jamming methods, though only if it has the bandwidth to do
57 Ibid. The power a jammer requires to be effective is directly related to its distance from its target, and the
other transmitter/receiver in the target's communications link. The greater the jammer's power the more
distance it can put between itself and its target. While there are many properties from distance between
transmission, reception, and jamming sources to transmission and jamming power to antenna properties that
determine a jammer's ability to be effective, perhaps one of the most valuable metrics is the J/S ratio. The J/S
ratio is similar to the SNR. Both the J/S is measured in decibels, making a more positive value favor the
jamming signal.
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so and the jammer doesn't use overwhelming amounts of power or can tune very quickly
through the band.
The message being transmitted itself can also have AJ properties. As noted
previously, radio waves can interact with the different media through which it must
travel in ways that can affect the message. Error-correction is used so that the correct
message can be received even if parts of the message are corrupted. Error-correction is
also effective against jamming. There are several forms of error-correction, the simplest
being to transmit the same message multiple times. This can be an effective method
against narrowband, wideband, CW, and pulse jamming because it relies on redundancy
to get them message across. However, repeating a message multiple times can slow the
information throughput and if the right equipment and power is used, wideband and CW
jamming methods can be effective.
Other Forms of amming
Two other forms of jamming attack the nature of the satellite and digital SATCOM
itself. One simple method known as "power stealing" attempts not to disrupt other
transmissions directly, but to trick the satellite into jamming friendly transmissions.
When communications satellites receive signals they attempt to weed out noise, which
occurs naturally, from the signals they are trying to receive.5 8 The satellite takes higher
power signals, amplifies them, and retransmits them to their destination or another relay
point. In this way, the noise is drowned out. Power stealing uses this process to its
advantage by transmitting high power noise to the satellite, usually trying to achieve
about a 6dB J/S. Unaware that the higher power signal is pernicious, the satellite amplifies
the jamming signal and drowns out the friendly signal. This is also know as the "near-far"
problem and most forms of anti-jamming EP are vulnerable to this as this simple method
58 Ibid., pg 55-60. Noise can be produced from a number naturally occurring sources including thermal
conditions, external and internal electrical conditions, and the interference from other legitimate signals
and reflections of the same signal.
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preys on the satellite itself. 59 Very simple equipment can be used for this technique as it
only requires high power, on the order of kilowatts or lower, and not complex signal
outputs.
The second form attempts to disable the user terminal from being able to track, or
follow, a friendly satellite signal. By energizing a satellite with signals of the correct
power and frequency, jammers can cause the satellite to retransmit modulated signals
which confuses the ground terminal into following a jamming signal. This method of
signal desynchronization takes advantage of the satellite and the harmonic nature of radio
frequencies. However, this method requires knowledge of the systems it is trying to jam
which may be difficult to obtain.
Power stealing and desynchronization are not easily protected against by SS
techniques because they attack the satellite itself. However, by equipping a satellite with
onboard processing capabilities, which many satellites do not have, it can better
distinguish and attenuate unwanted signals. There are AJ methods that can counter power
stealing and desynchronization. These methods take advantage of, and sometimes imitate,
naturally occruing phenomena. As mentioned beforehand, directional antennas focus
most of their radiated energy into a single beam, called the main lobe, which extends
outwards in one direction with some azimuth. However, some of the energy is radiated in
other directions called side lobes. In between the main and side lobes are "nulls", the
absence of radiated energy. Because jammers need to interact with the lobes of the
antenna in order to be effective some antennas use a method called null steering to protect
themselves. Null steering uses the natural nulls of an antenna, or creates them with other
antennas, and positions them over areas where a jammer is believed to be. This AJ
59 Ibid., 197. Direct sequenced Spread Spectrum techniques are inherently vulnerable to this form of
jamming. This is because it reduces the signal-to-noise ratio in order to hide the signal in noise, making it
harder to discover. However, this consequentially increases the jamming-to-signal ratio making it easier for
a jamming signal to overpower a legitimate signal.
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technique is effective against all forms of jamming because it disallows the jammer from
interacting with its target.
Another form of AJ, or rather jam resistance, antennas have comes from the nature
of the frequencies it uses. Transmissions using the SHF and EHF bands can create very
narrow main lobes. The narrower the main lobe is, the closer the jammer has to be to the
receiving terminal to be effective. While this property of highly directional transmissions
can combat the ease at which a jammer can affect a target, it is more a passive than an
active defense. Omni-directional receivers cannot benefit from this property.
Today's Systems
Today's MILSATCOM consists of three satellite systems: Ultra High Frequency
Follow-On (UFO); the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS); and the Military
Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR). However, because commercial satellites are used
by the military, COMERSAT has also been included.
As is may be understood from the descriptions of the jamming and anti-jamming
techniques, very few jamming techniques are made impossible by the use of AJ. They are
only made more difficult. How well one employs a jammer is also an important factor in
determining the effectiveness of a jamming scheme. Therefore, it is better to measure
vulnerability by comparing each system's specifications and AJ capabilities to the level of
technology required to threaten the system.
UFO
The Ultra High Frequency Follow-On system, consisting of ten GEO satellites was
created to carry on the mission of several other systems at the end of their lifetimes. UFO
currently takes the place of the US Navy's Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM)
system, takes on some of the US Air Force's Air Force Satellite Communications
(AFSATCOM) system's mission, as well as provides UHF links previously shouldered by
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leased satellites (LEASAT). The primary mission of UFO is to service tactical users with
low to medium information. 6 0 It is also primarily a US Navy system.
UFO's key vulnerabilities stem from the fact that many of its links do not employ
AJ techniques. All of the UFO satellites have the capacity for UHF links, which are
inherently more vulnerable because the UHF band is not large and so doesn't allow for
much Spread Spectrum AJ or error-correction. The UHF links also do not provide onboard
processing. This allows them to be vulnerable to many forms of jamming including power
stealing. The SHF links that the system provides are also at risk because they do not
perform sufficient Spread Spectrum AJ or onboard processing. The EHF links are better
protected with Spread Spectrum techniques and onboard processing, this includes the
Global Broadcast Service (GBS) links.6' The longitudinal location of UFO satellites can also
be found in open sources. While their exact location may be unknown, GEO satellites
tend to be equatorial and changing orbits can drastically reduce the lifetime of a satellite.
Each of the ten satellites has twenty-one narrowband UHF channels at 5 kbps,
seventeen relay channels at 25 kbps, and one fleet broadcast channel totaling 555 kbps of
UHF bandwidth. Three satellites also provide some SHF links for mobile communications.
The EHF payloads on three satellites carry eleven low to medium bit rate channels, the
rest carry twenty channels. Each satellite shares its EHF channels between an Earth beam
and a spot beam. The GBS equipped satellites can each handle 96 Mbps with its three
steerable downlink antennas, and its one steerable, one fixed uplink antennas.6 2
60 Globalsecurity, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/ufo.htm; The Boeing Company,
http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/bss/factsheets/601/uhffollowon/uhffollowon.html; Accessed
August 2, 2005.
61 Donald H. Martin, "A History of Military Satellite Communications Systems," (Crosslink)
http://www. aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2002/01.html.
62 The Boeing Company, http://www.boeing.com/defense-
space/space/bss/factsheets/601 ll/uhff_ followon.html; Accessed August 2, 2005.
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DSCS
The Defense Satellites Communications System was first put into orbit in the
1960's as the Initial Defense Satellite Communications System. Since that time the
Department of Defense (DoD) has put up two more versions of the system and is currently
on its third. The current system, using DSCS-III satellites, serves a host of users from the
White House Communications Agency, to mobile military terminals, to the State
Department and Strategic Command. The main purpose of DSCS is to provide long-haul,
high data rate communications to the aforementioned users.63
The vulnerabilities in DSCS arise from its use of two Earth coverage receive
antennas, allowing jammers to be positioned far from a conflict, and the lack of onboard
processing.64 The longitudinal locations of the satellites are also in open sources, and they
cover the East and West Atlantic and Pacific as well as the Indian Ocean. However, the
DSCS satellites do have some AJ capabilities. All save one of the DSCS channels use the
SHF band, which is wider than the UHF band and allows for better encryption schemes.
The other single channel uses both UHF and SHF for Emergency Action Message
broadcast and does not present a major vulnerability unless in nuclear crises. The satellites
also carry multibeam antennas that allow selective nulling, a form of null steering, and
jammer location electronics.65
DSCS is made up of five active satellites in GEO, with four as back-ups, creating
nearly complete global coverage. Each satellite can transmit across six X-band channels
(from 7.25-8.4 GHz) using three receive and five transmit antennas.66 One of the receive
and two of the transmit antennas are multibeam lenses, allowing them to create sixty-one
controlled beams and selective nulling. It also has four Earth coverage antennas, two
receive and two transmit, as well as one mechanically gimbaled transmit antenna. The
63 MILSATCOM Joint Program Office,http://www.losangeles.af.miV/S MC/dscs.htm; Accessed August 2,
2005..
64 GlobalSecurity, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/dscs_3.htm; Accessed August 2, 2005.
65 Globalsecurity, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/dscs_3-substm.htm.
66 GlobalSecurity, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/dscs_3.htm; Accessed August 2, 2005.
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DSCS-III satellites can use spot, area, global coverage, and rapidly selective coverage
beams. The six channels have an average bandwidth of 71.6 MHz and a total bandwidth
covering 500 MHz, and up to 200 Mbps.6 7 The DSCS-III satellites also carry a single
channel for Emergency Action Message broadcast.
MILSTAR
MILSTAR is the DoD's most reliable SATCOM system. The Military Strategic and
Tactical Relay satellite system was created to supply long-haul links of communication for
the President, the DoD, and the Armed Services in jamming environments and even in
nuclear war. Detonation of nuclear devices can change the atmosphere enough that radio
waves, below the microwave band cannot pass through them for a period of time. Nuclear
detonations could also destroy valuable ground relay stations, severing the ground hop
that SATCOM often uses. For these reasons, MILSTAR was designed as an EHF band
communications satellite, which are not as distrupted by atmospheric effects present after
a nuclear detonation, and as a system that could transmit information directly from one
satellite to another utilizing cross-links.
Vulnerability in MILSTAR would result from its use of Earth coverage beams
though this is compensated for by its robust AJ capabilities. All of MILSTAR's links are in
EHF band, meaning that it supplies ample room for Spread Spectrum techniques,
especially because the data rates at which it performs do not take up a considerable
amount of EHF's bandwidth. The higher data rate transponders also carry antennas
specifically designed for null steering, and the satellites implement onboard processing.68
Though these measures account for all of the jamming techniques described above, it
would be remiss to say that MILSTAR is jam-proof.
67 MILSATCOM Joint Program Office, http://www.losangeles.af.mil/SMC/MC/dscs.htm; Accessed August 2,
2005.
68 Donald H. Martin, "A History of Military Satellite Communications Systems," (Crosslink)
http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2002/01 .html.
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Five MILSTAR satellites orbit the Earth in GEO. Two, MILSTAR-I satellites, can
only have low data rate (LDR) payloads allowing for data rates of 75 bps to 2.4 kbps in 192
channels. The other three, MILSTAR-II satellites, have both LDR and medium data rate
(MDR) payloads. The MDR payloads can transmit data from 4.8 kbps to 1.544 Mbps in 32
channels.6 9 The LDR payloads have antennas for Earth coverage up and downlinks,
positional up and downlink beams, and 2 narrow and 1 wide spot beam. The MDR
payloads offer 8 antennas, 6 for area coverage and 2 for nulling.70
The MILSTAR system is the most robust of the three MILSATCOM systems. The
MDR payloads offer area beams and 2 antennas dedicated to nulling, making the antenna
system quite robust against jamming attempts. Onboard processing and use of Spread
Spectrum techniques over the EHF band protects the system from power stealing,
desychronization, and most other forms of noise jamming.
COMERSA T
The systems described above only account for MILSATCOM and only make up
approximately 14% bandwidth needs for peacetime activities, tactical patrols, and
training.7' The remainder of bandwidth must be obtained commercially. The design of
commercial satellites is not driven by the requirements of MILSATCOM and thus
COMERSAT is quite vulnerable to jamming. They are designed to transfer data over the
C, Ku, and Ka bands and to offer the most users the most amount of bandwidth possible,
not to offer robust, secure communications links in an EA environment. As a result, they
sacrifice the protection that comes from having wide, open bandwidths for Spread
Spectrum techniques and do not have onboard processing for the most part.72 Other AJ
69 MILSATCOM Joint Program Office, http://www.losangeles.af.mil/SMC/MC/milstar.htm; Accessed August
2, 2005.
70 Ibid.
71 Bonds, Mattock, Hamilton, et. al., Employing Commercial Satellite Communications, pg 8.
72 Globalsecurity, "Executive Summary of Commercial Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Report,"
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/navy/commrept/index.html.
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systems, such as dedicated null steering antennas or AJ detection equipment, are also rare
because they require space and power that could be used by revenue producing
transponders. However, while the majority of systems are quite vulnerable, some systems
are providing better measures of protection in order to shield their transmissions from
technically capable vandals.
Commercial satellites orbit in GEO as well as Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Medium
Earth Orbit (MEO) and carry Earth, area, and spot beams, though the spot beams are not
as narrow as the military satellites can provide. 73 Their orbits are also well documented
and accessible.74 The technology and SATCOM knowledge required to jam a commercial
satellite is easily accessible and becoming more so as IT usage increases around the world.
One anecdote suggests that a common commercial satellite can be jammed by any TV
technician with $1000 of easily acquirable electronics equipment.7 5 Another COMERSAT
vulnerability comes in a legal form. Being that COMERSAT is regulated by civilian
entities such as the UN's International Telecommunications Union (ITU), landing-rights,
or rights to transmit and broadcast over a state, are regulated by each individual state. This
could mean that a state in a conflict with the US could effectively deny the use of
COMERSAT within its boundaries. Such an action, however, could also affect the state's
use of COMERSAT. This all does not bode well for the military's SATCOM users.
Unfortunately, MILSATCOM's future use will still have its problems. The
SATCOM usage rate of growth is projected to continue to far exceed MILSATCOM's
capacity for the next ten years. Even with the incorporation of the Advanced EHF, GBS,
and Wideband Gapfiller satellites, MILSATCOM could fall short some 1-10 Gbps.76 Thus,
73 Bonds, Mattock, Hamilton, et. al., Employing Commercial Satellite Communications, pg 70. While
satellites in LEO and MEO do not have relatively constant locations, they can be followed using satellite
tracking technology, such as radar, which is an essential technology for SATCOM and does not require
highly complex equipment.
74 This is especially true for states that use COMERSAT because this information can be accessed through
the satellite control corporations and international regulatory organizations such as the ITU.
75 Ibid., pg 74.
76 Ibid., pg 10.
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MILSATCOM will have to continue to depend on less than secure links to communicate
its rising amounts of information.
Summary
Table 3 below summarizes the vulnerabilities of each of the military's SATCOM
systems by considering each system's vulnerabilities and the difficulty to exploit those
vulnerabilities as mentioned in EW subsection. The vulnerability of UFO was given a
vulnerability score of medium-high because its UHF and SHF links present a considerable
vulnerability, while its EHF links do not. Though the DSCS system does not perform
onboard processing, the use of the SHF band, its null sterring capabilities, and its jammer
location electronics amount to a medium score of vulnerability. The MILSTAR is the least
vulnerable because of its robust AJ, compensating for its use of Earth coverage beams.
COMERSAT is the most vulnerable because it does not implement many of the AJ
techniques used in MILSATCOM, being specifically designed to provide large amounts of
bandwidth not protection. A lack of onboard processing also makes it highly vulnerable to
the simple technique of power stealing.
Table 3 - SATCOM Vulnerabilities to Jamming
'Technology Level ofSystem Vulnerability Level ofRequired to Jam Vulnerability
UHF band, Earth
UFO Coverage Beams, Low - Mid-level Medium-HighPartial Onboard
Processing
Lack of Onboard
DSCS Processing, Earth Low- Mid-level Medium
Coverage Beams
Earth CoverageMILSTAR ea High-level Low
Beams
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While the majority of the MILSATCOM systems are only medially vulnerable on
average, the highly vulnerable COMERSAT supplies almost all of the military's
bandwidth. This may not change as the voracious bandwidth demand brought on by the
iRMA cannot be sated by MILSATCOM nor will it be able to in the near future. As
Information Warfare is better understood and implemented by state and non-state actors
and as the military better integrates the joint, precision and net-centric doctrines of the
iRMA, these vulnerabilities will without doubt have an impact on the military's ability to
carry on its many tasks.
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Lack of Onboard
Processing, Wide
Commercial Coverage Beams, Low-level HighNot Designed to
Survive AJ
Environment
Chapter 3
Assessing the Chinese Threat
A measurement of a system's or its implementation's vulnerability alone is
insufficient to assess the level of threat an adversary can pose to it. One must also
understand the adversary's abilities. As the US military has transformed and integrated the
doctrines and tactics that the iRMA have allowed, so too has the PLA. Though the PRC is
still many years behind the US, this has not stopped them from seeking ways to defend
against, and possibly overcome, the US's superior might. The PLA understands the
advantages and disadvantages of the iRMA, and after carefully noting recent US military
actions, it has discovered some of the vulnerabilities associated with it, vulnerabilities
which it seeks to exploit. The PRC's knowledge-base and doctrinal and tactical means of
using Information Warfare are not highly advanced, but their rapid economic and
technological growth over recent years has made them a credible threat.
As described in the previous chapter, jamming the most likely form of IW an
adversary would carry out against the military's SATCOM and so is the focus of this
chapter. Physical destruction, cited in the previous chapter as a less likely form of IW,
may also be of use to the Chinese as they do have indigenous launch capabilities. Though
the assessment of Chinese capabilities completed here is not definitive on whether the
PLA can or will jam, or physically attack SATCOM because of the nature of the sources,
PLA IW rhetoric and current technical capacity suggest it would be best to assume they
can and will.
This chapter attempts to evaluate the PRC's ability to threaten the US military's
SATCOM systems. The chapter is segmented into five sections. The first discusses how the
PRC understands the iRMA, and what strategies it can implement accounting for it. The
second section gauges the PRC's knowledge-base of the technology needed to perform
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successful IW against SATCOM. The third assesses the military infrastructure and force
structure built around IW. The fourth brings together the previous three sections to
understand the PRC ability to threaten SATCOM. The final section summarizes the
chapter.
The sources used here based their research on Chinese doctrinal writings, articles
in the PLA Daily, interviews with Chinese sources, historical research, and previous
studies. Much of the Chinese writing pertaining to IW and their military technology
capabilities is theoretic and opaque. This is either because they have very little to say or
because they are performing an Information Operation. In any case, knowledge of their
true capabilities can become lost in generalities and rhetoric. Because of this, scholars
often overestimate or underappreciate Chinese capabilities. While this author believes
that both practices can lead to dangerous misperceptions, he also believes that in a case
where facts are few, one must seriously consider any that are found and with reason assess
how to weigh them. The sources used here touch on both sides of the spectrum and so the
findings here should be taken with a hint of caution as the author does.
Understanding the Chinese iRMA
Deciphering how another state is influenced by an event such as the iRMA can be
a difficult task, but it is an important one as this can aid in the prediction of a state's
actions. Recognizing and understanding the theories, assumptions, and beliefs of a state as
well as its history of strategies can provide invaluable insight into why and how a state
will shape itself to meet the threats it perceives. By surveying the modernization
developments, how the iRMA has affected the Chinese mindset, IW rhetoric, as well as a
how the Chinese use war, it appears that that the iRMA has not gone unnoticed in China's
efforts to step into the modern world and that attacking communications is considered an
important IW tactic.
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It should be noted, however, that while intentions and abilities to commence C2W
and EW are present, they are not highlighted as much as the evidence surrounding
China's IW competency involves CNA and OPSEC. This alone should not suggest that the
Chinese are not as involving in EW theory, but simply that evidence has little to say on
the subject. This could be because the Chinese truly are not focusing on EW, they are
practicing OPSEC about their capabilities and intentions, or that researchers have
considered China's CNA more than other forms of IW. Though the reason is unknown, a
subtle clue as to whether EW if of interest to the Chinese may be their focus on
communications systems and their protection.
Prior to 1979 the PLA was structured around fighting a "people's war". "People's
war" was a defensive war fought on Chinese soil that aimed to grind an adversary away
through a war of attrition.77 This was facilitated by scattering key facilities and centers
throughout the country, disabling an adversary from quickly destroying China's
warfighting capabilities. The PLA's large and antiquated forces were equipped for fighting
such a war which relied more on numbers than firepower. This is changing.
The PLA is now trying to fit itself with modern equipment and doctrines believing
it must be able to survive "local war under informationalization". This shift began
following the return of Deng Xiaoping to the chief of the General Staff in the Central
Military Commission, the leading body of the PLA, in 1975. At that time, the complexities
of the international system have impressed upon the Chinese that the world was much
smaller than they once thought. States had grown interdependent through economics,
politics, and treaties. This interdependence and the ever present threat of nuclear war
spawned the belief that local or limited war, war which is confined, quick, and fought to
create diplomatic success, was becoming the most likely form of military conflict in the
77 Shambaugh's Modernizing China 's Militarywas used as the major source for China's modernization
history.
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modern world.78 Under Deng's guidance, the PLA attempted to rapidly restructure itself to
meet the future. Defense commissions, departments, organizations, and the PLA force
structure were streamlined in the attempt to create a more centralized and flexible force.
Though the first reconstruction ended without creating the efficiencies that the PLA
hoped to gain, several more followed and continue today.
Soon after the shift to local war took hold, the ending of the Cold War drastically
changed the global political landscape. The new unipolar world created a situation where
the PRC could continue to flex its muscles, as it believed it could during the superpower
stalemate in the mid-80's, but it now had to be wary not to offend the allies of the now
unrivaled Western superpower. This new development forced the PLA leaders to realize
that their actions could very well place them opposite the battleline of the most powerful
nation in the world.
A few years later, the First Gulf War revealed to the PRC what it would be up
against. The lightening fast war spurred on by ship-fired cruise missiles, stealth bombers,
precision-guided munitions, and joint warfare astounded the PLA leadership. They found
that while their unsuccessful streamlining was a step in the right direction, they were still
far behind the state they began to see as their primary opponent. The advances in US
military technology were so impressive that many in the PLA were convinced that a new
era of warfare was upon them; one that was based on computer and information
technology, mobility, and jointness. It took special note of the US's Electronic Warfare
campaign, and the use of satellites and communications which it saw as critical to the
Allied success. 79 This information Revolution in Military Affairs prompted further
reorganization and modernization of the PLA structure.
The US-led intervention during the First Gulf War as well as the Balkan conflicts
also had another effect. While direct conflict with the US was very unlikely, the PLA
78 Mark Buries and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China's Use of Force. Evidence From doctrinal Writings,
(Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 2000), pg 29-35.
79 Shambaugh, Modernizing China 's Military, pg 73.
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feared that a crisis could arise that would pit it against the US through one of its eastern
allies. These US-led interventions, the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the more recent
actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, reaffirmed and fueled these fears and the belief that the
US is securing for itself global hegemony. It is for all of these reasons that the PRC
believes it must prepare for "local war under informationalization", suggesting that it
believes it may have to fight a limited conflict with a technologically superior,
informationalized adversary, the US.
Though the PLA lags behind the US in modernization and its implementation of
the iRMA, it is not without insights. The PLA is aware that the information, and the
communication on which it depends, both strengthens joint and precision warfare as well
as creates a critical link in the armor that can be targeted and destroyed with considerable
consequences. It also understands the unique nature of the iRMA in that the same
technology which makes its enemy so formidable can also enable its own weaker forces to
strike back through IW.80 Armed with this knowledge, the PLA hopes to become not a
victim of the iRMA, but a master of it.
Information Warfare, as described in the previous chapter, can affect a wide range
of apparati and there is some question as to how well the Chinese understand IW, EW in
particular. Much of what the PLA publishes on IW is heavily adapted, if not taken, from
US sources and theoretic in nature.' This is not to say that they haven't any grasp of it.
The PLA appreciates both its offensive and defensive nature as well as its military and
civilian uses.82 C2W, EA, and CNA are common topics in PLA publications and they have
discussed implementing elements of IW from spreading computer viruses to using high-
80 Shambaugh, Modernizing, pg 70-73.
81 James C. Mulvenon, "The PLA and Information Warfare," in The People 's Liberation Army in the
Information Age, James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang ed. (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp., 1999),
pg 177; Yoshihara, Chinese Information Warfare: A Phantom Menace or Emerging Threat., pg 23-25.
82 Shambaugh, Modernizing, pg 74-81; Yoshihara, Chinese Information Warfare: A Phantom Menace or
Emerging Threat.2, pg 28-29; Mulvenon, "The PLA and IW," pg 179; Mark A. Stokes, China 's Strategic
Modernization (SSI, Sept. 1999), pg 52.
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power microwave weapons.83 There have been several papers concerning the attack of
logistics and C2 communications, GPS, the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
(JTIDS) and SATCOM.84 Military training programs have also been established to create
"cyber soldiers" capable of hacking their way through an adversary's software defenses to
mine information or infect systems with viruses. These soldiers may have already seen
action in cyber battles with the Taiwanese and possibly the US.85 The US-China Economy
and Security Review Commission claims that the PLA may also have developed a laser
cannon able to strike 100 plus kilometers into space with which to "blind" reconnaissance
satellites.86 Having studied the First Gulf War and the Balkan conflicts, the PLA has also
learned the value of shielding electronic equipment, hardening and creating redundant
communications nodes, as well as the value of hiding equipment more effectively. The
PRC has been identified as one of the world's top producers of obscurants which are
effective against sensor and guidance technologies. 87 It may also have initiated the
interlacing of military communications with civilian systems believing that the US would
seek not to destroy vital civilian links.88 Furthermore, the Chinese believe that IW is
central to fighting future war and remaining abreast with the modern world.89
83 Yoshihara, Chinese Information Warfare: A Phantom Menace or Emerging Threat?, pg 13; Stokes, Chinas
Strategic Modernization, pg 52-53.
84 Michael Pillsbury, "China's Military Strategy Toward the US: A View from Open Sources," (Nov. 2001)
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/pdfs/strat.pdf
,pg 11-12; Stokes, China 's Strategic Modernization, pg 53.
85 Damon Bristow, "China and Taiwan: information warfare," (Global-Defense) http://www.global-
defence.com/2000/pages/china.html; Accessed August 2, 2005; Robert Vamosi, "Will China (cyber) attack
Taiwan, US?"(CNET: May 3, 2002) http://asia.cnet.com/news/perspectives/0,39037107,39041620,00.htm;
Accessed August 2, 2005; Global Information Warfare pg 218-220, 224-234. This book as collected a number
of news clippings from various source citing the use of IW, CNA especially, by the PRC.
86 US-China Economy and Security Review Commission, 2004 Report to Congress, (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
2004), pg 202. Blinding a satellite requires much less power than shooting one down.
87 Burles and Shulsky, Patterns, pg 66; Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, "Advanced Military
Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the 21st Century," in The Chinese Armed Forces in
the 21"s Century, (SSI), pg 173.
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It is unclear how the PLA intends to implement IW, but they do hope to do so
against an adversary far superior in its iRMA ability and depth of integration.9 0 A survey
of papers and articles suggests that the PLA considers theories of asymmetric warfare
important.9 l Asymmetric warfare implies that a weaker force will fight a stronger force
through exploitation of its vulnerabilities. This is of considerable importance as it implies
that the Chinese readily acknowledge the disparity between the US forces and their own.
Often surrounding the discussion of IW is talk of "Inferior Defeating the Superior"
strategies and of "Assassin's Maces". An Assassin's Mace can be likened to a "silver bullet"
or secret weapons which, leveraged correctly, can defeat an opponent who is superior in
strength. Of the many Assassin's Maces that are written about, IW is a major one.
Fantastic as such a weapon may sound, the discussion of it should not be taken lightly as
high ranking military officials and President Jiang Zemin himself has called for their
creation. 92 Thus, considering that the PLA sees the US's dependence on information
technology as a weakness, it would be prudent to believe that they do plan on attacking
the vulnerabilities in our information systems.9 3
Recognizing past PLA uses of force and their theory of limited war may allow for
an even better understanding of how they may implement IW. A study completed by the
RAND Corp. highlighted several strategic patterns the PLA tends to use. They are
Surprise, Psycho-Political Shock, Opportunistic Timing, and the Use of Crises.94 Each of
these strategies is aimed at affecting the will of the adversary more so than its ability to
fight. Surprise can be understood on a tactical and strategic level. Tactically, surprise can
be viewed as using deceit to create a battlefield advantage such as feigning retreats or
changing the war's pace by preemptively striking. Strategic surprise could be the
concealment of force strengths, doctrines, and capabilities. Psycho-Political Shock can be
90 Yoshihara, Chinese Information Warfare: A Phantom Menace or Emerging Threat?, pg 9.
91 Shambaugh, Modernization, pg 74-81; Toshiro pg 6-7; Michael Pillsbury, "China's Military Strategy".
92 Pillsbury, "China's Military Strategy," pg 13-15.
93 Shambaugh, Modernization, pg 61-71, 89.
94 Burles and Shulsky, Patterns, pg 5-20.
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exampled by implementing tactics that produce high causalities to both sides in order to
declare willingness to fight and to force their adversary to realize that costs will be high.
This strategy would work best against casualty-adverse states, which the PLA believes the
US to be.95 Opportunistic Timing is a strategy which waits to create large, favorable force
imbalances before attacking. This imbalance can also be created by coaxing an enemy into
a position which overstretches his logistic lines or distance from friendly bases. The Use of
Crises is more benign. While also aimed at defeating an adversary, crises may be incited or
exploited to create a political situation or statement to cause an adversary to rethink his
diplomatic and even military strategies.
The PLA's objective of fighting limited war complements the fact that the US
forces are superior well. If the objective is to weaken the US's political and military
resolve, the PLA forces need not rank with the US's. It only need to produce effects that
would give the US pause. The strategies listed above may be able to do just that by
working asymmetrically against a particular US weakness, be it casualty aversion or the
PRC's distance from the US. While the exact strategy that would be used is unknown, nor
is it clear that the PLA would target SATCOM, the PLA's insights into the iRMA, and the
US's strengths and weaknesses as well as its own, suggest that IW, especially against
communication systems, will be a key factor to any implementation.
Gauging the Chinese Knowledge-Base
Comprehending the PLA's intent to use IW and the strategies it would implement
against the US is important. However, partaking in IW requires technical knowledge.
SATCOM, while conceptually simple, can be quite complex in its undertaking. The
electronics used to develop and operate a satellite constellation, its ground relay network,
and the user-end terminals are not crude devices and require proficiencies in a number of
technical areas. Without familiarity and a grounded knowledge of the intricacies of
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satellite technology, constructing an effective countermeasure to SATCOM would be very
difficult. Though the Chinese are not as technologically developed as the US, it does
appear that they grasp many of the concepts and can produce much of the equipment
necessary for executing EW against SATCOM.
China's first experimental communications satellite was launched into GEO in
1984. Since that time China has launched a number of communications satellites by itself
and through joint ventures with other nations. Though SATCOM is now vital for
television broadcasts and telecommunications throughout most of China, only a small
portion of it is provided by indigenously built Chinese satellites. The majority of
throughput comes from foreign satellites either through leased transponders or foreign
procurement. 96 The PLA's use of SATCOM has also been reliant on foreign satellites.
Several failures with its DFH-3 series satellites, a joint project with the Daimler-Benz
company in Germany, pushed the PLA to leasing transponders from commercial
providers.97 New satellites such as the Chinese built DFH-IV and the military-dedicated
FH-I series satellites may enable the PLA to meet their telecoms needs once these
satellites are launched and integrated into their appropriate C4 I2SR (command, control,
communications, computer, intelligence, information, sensor, reconnaissance) networks.98
While not directly related to SATCOM, China also possesses a number of ISR satellites
and is working on microsatellites.99 Some of these satellites do require telecommunications
to transfer data and perform maintenance. This all suggests that the Chinese are adept in
SATCOM.
9 Roger Cliff, The Military Potential of China 's Commercial Technology (Santa Monica California: The
RAND Corporation, 2001), pg 19.
97 Cole and Godwin, pg 180-181; Chinese Defence Today, (December 8, 2002)
http://www.sinodefence.com/space/spacecraft/dfh3.asp; Accessed August 2, 2005.
98 Chinese Defence Today, http://www.sinodefence.com/space/spacecraft/fh.asp; Accessed August 2, 2005.;
Chinese Defence Today, (December 8, 2002) http://www.sinodefence.com/space/spacecraft/dfh4.asp;
Accessed August 2, 2005.
99 DoD, Report to Congress, pg 35-36.
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While the PRC has demonstrated its ability to use SATCOM, many of the
technologies and components that are used are of foreign origin or constructed through
joint ventures with foreign companies. In order for this to change, the PRC must educate
more engineers and better foster industrial innovations. China does possess a cadre of
scientists, engineers, and technicians but organizational factors can often be attributed to
their slow progress. °° It also only graduates a small percentage of its population with
advanced science and engineering degrees. Estimates state China graduated some 1-2
million students per year from institutions of higher learning in recent years. Of these,
only about 7% of those educated are engineers, and the percentage of graduates with
advanced degrees in computer science and mathematics is lower."' In comparison, the US
graduates roughly the same number of students from post-secondary schools of which 5%
were in engineering in the year 2002. 12 Though the numbers are similar, the US graduates
4 times as many students by percentage of population. Some Chinese students do technical
studies in Western countries, but few of them return to add to the domestic technical
knowledge-base.103
The technology industry also suffers from a lack of strength. Telecommunications
technologies, as stated above, are heavily dependent on foreign companies. While China
does produce a number of technological goods, such as computers, fiber optic cable, and
communications switching systems, it is not able to produce some of their vital
components.'0 4 Nonetheless, China is not without some strength. Foreign IT developments
and telecommunications modernization are growing rapidly and do benefit the state as
100 Modernizing China's Military pg 190.
101 Shambaugh, Modernization, pg 249-250; Chinese Education and Research Network, (January, 19, 2005)
http://www.edu.cn/20050119/3127194.shtml; Accessed July 27, 2005.
102 Digest ofEducation Statistics, 2003, (National Center for Education Statistics)
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dO3/tables/dt255.asp; Accessed July 27, 2005.
103 Shambaugh, Modernization, pg 250.
104 Cliff, TMPCCT, pg 11-21.
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foreign companies are pressed into sharing their technology.105 The PLA will also benefit
from the highly innovative public IT sector China is developing as well as from its own
close ties to the state's telecommunications services.1'06 Both its indigenous microwave
transmission technology and software production capabilities are approaching, if not
meeting international standards and are important for IW.107
In summary, the PRC's knowledge of SATCOM and some associated technologies
is present. The presence and use of SATCOM knowledge indicates that the fundamental
concepts of jamming SATCOM are available to the PRC. Its competency in constructing
technical goods and in its own microwave technology suggests that the technical
knowledge needed to construct jammers that can affect SATCOM is also available.
Though the PRC's dependence on foreign electronic components and technologies and its
small percentage of technical training may suggest that the PRC's knowledge-base is still
not yet mature, this does not represent an inability to prosecute jamming, especially in the
form of power stealing which does not require very high technologies or technical
knowledge. Coupled with this fact is that the high influx of foreign technologies and the
innovations that the public IT sector are seeing, will, if not already, have transferred over
to some military capability.
Assessing Means
In order to have a decisive effect on the US military's use of SATCOM, the PRC
would need to have more than just the intent and knowledge-base to do so; it must also
have the means. As the US's SATCOM networks become better integrated and robust, so
too must the PRC's ability to exploit its vulnerabilities. Against a well connected force,
105 Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan S. Medeiros, et al., Modernizing China 's Military: Opportunities and
Constraints (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp., 2005), pg 188.
106 Ibid.; James Mulvenon and Thomas J. Bickford, "The PLA and the Telecommunications Industry in
China," in The People 's Liberation Army in the Information Age, James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang
ed. (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp., 1999).
107Cliff, TMPCCT, pg 15-18.
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momentary disruptions in a small number of systems would only have minimal effects.
For IW, and specifically attacks against SATCOM, to have a chance of deterring or
defeating the US by providing an asymmetric advantage or an Assassin's Mace, it must be
undertaken methodically with the proper doctrine and in a centralized manner with the
proper equipment.
It appears that China has neither the doctrines nor the equipment is known to be
in place to implement EW. However, the opacity of doctrinal writings and desire to keep
capabilities secret imply that a dearth of evidence does not indicate a lack of means.
Several components necessary for jamming SATCOM, such as microwave technology and
satellite tracking, are provided for by the PRC. Coupling this fact with their desire to
utilize the advantages of IW, it would remiss to believe the PRC does not have the means
to attack SATCOM.
Any detailed IW doctrine or order of battle that the PLA may have has not yet
been discovered. Some sources indicate that it does not have an independent IW strategy,
but four facts must be recognized.108 First, as aforementioned, the PLA does recognize the
potential of IW against a technologically dependent adversary. Efforts have been made to
harden communications nodes, upgrade electronics equipment with better shielding,
interlace military communications links with civilian links, create better concealment
methods, etc. Schools and centers of excellence of IW have been established, units are
being educated in ways of cyber-warfare, and IW has been practiced in war games. 109
Second, as mentioned before, the Chinese do find that communications links are critical to
the success of modern militaries and their disruption could be decisive. Third, the "24-
Character" strategy and "peaceful rise" rhetoric highlights the PRC's drive to develop into
an international power without frightening its neighbors and other world powers. While
08 Mulvenon, "The PLA and IW," pg 185; Yoshihara, Chinese Information Warfare: A Phantom Menace or
Emerging Threat, pg 9, 15;
'09 Shambaugh, Modernization, pg 76-81; Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual
Report to Congress.' MilitaryPower of the People 's Republic of China 2005 (Washington, D.C: 2005), pg 36;
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the PRC focuses greatly on building up its economic strength, it also believes that building
the military will play a key role in its ascension. To modernize without creating fear or
impedance, the 24-Character strategy suggests concealing capability. Fourth, the PRC has
successfully employed the art of deception in both tactical and strategic terms in the past,
and continues to teach its practice.' Though these facts do not dictate that an IW
doctrine, or one specifically focusing on jamming, does exist, they do point to its
likelihood.
How well organized an infrastructure and training program such a doctrine may
have is another question that must be asked. The State Council's China 's National Defense
in 2004 implies the PLA intent on creating such an infrastructure stating:
The PLA takes as its objective to win local wars under the conditions of informationalization
and gives priority to developing weaponry and equipment, to building joint operational capabilities,
and to making full preparations in the battlefields."'
Unfortunately, how developed the force and infrastructure are is also difficult to
discern from open sources. Reports have been made about a number of well-organized,
deliberate cyber-attacks allegedly Chinese in origin. The Korean Information Security
Agency stated that 10,628 cases of hacking had been logged in the first half of 2004 alone.
In an attack in 2005, hackers were able to mine sensitive information from South Korean
government computers. Officials stated that one of the attackers was identified as a
student in a PLA-run school."2 The nature of these attacks intimates that the PLA does
have units training in IW and may even have some that are operational. Though this does
l10 DoD, Annual Report, pg 11, 16; Pillsbury, "China's Military Strategy," pg 10. In fact, Pillsbury writes that
the information that can be found in the open sources about China's IW capabilities only scratches the
surface of what they are truly capable of and conceiving.
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Accessed July 31, 2005.
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not directly imply that units and equipment exists to prosecute EW against SATCOM, it
does reveal that the Chinese are making strides in making their military IW ready.
As mentioned in the previous chapter SIGINT can be important to EW campaigns.
China does posses significant ground, sea, and air-based SIGINT capabilities and has had
previous success with space-based SIGINT.l3 In peacetime, these capabilities could enable
the Chinese to better catalogue and identify civilian COMERSAT transmissions which
could allow them to more easily identify military communications, and therefore which
commercial satellites an adversary was using. Such a catalogue would be useful when
developing a jamming strategy and target lists. In war, their SIGINT capabilities could
enable them to better track satellite usage as for target identification and to assess whether
their jamming efforts were being effective. While SIGINT is not necessary for jamming a
satellite, without being able to discern what or who to jam, an EW campaign could easily
lose its tactical and strategic usefulness.
It would not be difficult to believe that the Chinese do have some means to
prosecute EW against SATCOM. The equipment necessary for "soft" IW, which attempts
to disrupt or destroy information throughput, e.g. jamming and computer viruses, requires
technologies in which the PRC are at least somewhat proficient and which are easier to
conceal. This is not to say that the PLA's IW capabilities are completely developed. "Hard"
IW, which attempts to destroy physical information infrastructure, on the other hand,
often requires technologies in which the PRC has trouble demonstrating competency, and
which foreign companies and nations may be unwilling to open up to the PRC.'14
113 Stokes, China s Strategic Modernization, pg 32-35. Globalsecurity,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/geo-sigint.htm; Chinese Defense Today,
http://www. sinodefence.com/c4i/command/default. asp.
114 Two major legal issues have created roadblocks in the path of technological development for the PRC.
The first is the arms embargo which was set in place by the G7 nations as a punitive measure for the
Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. The second is the lack of Chinese Intellectual Property Laws. Piracy
and reverse engineering are widespread in China making many companies fear sharing technology that may
be stolen without being able to take legal action.
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The Potential Threat
By understanding the Chinese view of the iRMA, taking stock of their knowledge-
base and means, it appears that the Chinese do have the will, skills, and equipment to
implement IW against SATCOM in the form of jamming and possibly physically
destructive ASAT. Though China appears to grasp all of the aspects of the Six Pillars, only
Electronic Warfare and Physical Destruction are directly applicable to affecting SATCOM.
Operations Security is more concerned with keeping information from the enemy, not
disrupting the enemy's information. Psychological Operations and Deception can be
manifest in the form of deception jamming, however, message and signal encryption
combat this well.
In a practical sense, softer forms of C2W such as EW seem the most likely manner
through which China may seek to exploit vulnerabilities in SATCOM. CNA could be
effective but because they affect only a few aspects of SATCOM, e.g. the maintenance
stations and teleports information gathering such as mining databases on exact locations of
satellites may be its most valuable contribution. In order to successfully jam SATCOM
China would need at a bare minimum satellite tracking and microwave transmission
technologies as well as platforms from which to perform uplink or downlink jamming. As
stated before, many of the MILSATCOM and commercial systems are locatable through
open sources, some low-tech methods, and satellite tracking facilities which China does
possess."' Microwave technology is also one of the few technologies that China has been
able to develop indigenously and a skill in SATCOM has been demonstrated, both of
which are critical to jam SATCOM. China has a capable SIGINT infrastructure with land,
sea, and air-based sensors as well, making it easier to find the SATCOM targets and assess
damage. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the large foreign investments into China's
telecommunications infrastructure have not provided for a better understanding of
modern communications systems.
115 Chinese Defence Today, http://www.sinodefence.com/space/facility/default.asp.
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While China is still unable to produce many high-end electronics itself, the
components necessary for jamming systems can be purchased from the foreign companies
present in China and are often benign enough to be purchased internationally. It also
must be noted that though the PRC may have difficulty producing components, it does
have the knowledge and capability to assemble devices such as computers and
communications switches. This all suggests that the Chinese possess both the technology
and know-how for jamming SATCOM.
The manner in which the Chinese may choose to deploy a jamming asset is
speculative. The exact depth of knowledge and technology the Chinese have pertaining to
SATCOM is unknown, but from the above assessments it may be possible to theorize what
strategies and forms jamming would take on.
Of the two jamming strategies, uplink and downlink jamming, uplink jamming
seems the easiest and more advantageous of the two. Downlink jamming requires a
jammer to be positioned in between the satellite and the ground segment to which it is
communicating. Aerial vehicles would fit well in this strategy. The Chinese are investing
in UAVs which can be converted into very capable downlink jamming platforms. 6
However, with the widespread modernization the PLA is undergoing, the expendable
nature of a UAV jammer may make their use too expensive. Other aircraft could be used
for downlink jams, but doing so place the aircraft at unacceptable risk because of its
nearness to the ground segment which may be a military unit.
Uplink jamming can be executed from a number of platforms, from manpacks to
ground vehicles to ships and can provide mobility and covertness. Though attacking a
satellite through narrow spot beams, or even area beams, may force the jammer to be
deployed near enemy forces, the distances are not as close as those required by downlink
jamming. Uplink jammers could also take advantage of Earth coverage beams from
distance within the Chinese mainland.
116 Chinese Defence Today, http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/uav/default.asp.
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Because the US military's SATCOM systems employ different AJ techniques, there
is no one jamming method that would work for all of them. Of the MILSATCOM systems,
power stealing appears to be the best method because few of UFO's and none of DSCS's
transponders use onboard processing. As mentioned before, power stealing is a simple
method and only requires a power source on the order of kilowatts. The current state of
the Chinese SATCOM capabilities suggests that this method is well within their ability to
implement. MILSATCOM's more robust EHF transponders on MILSTAR and UFO would
be more difficult to disrupt and possibly too difficult for the Chinese. A jamming scheme
such as barrage jamming or continuous wave jamming may be able to affect the EHF links,
however a great deal of power would be required for barrage jamming to be effective and
Spread Spectrum Frequency Hopping in the wide EHF band can probably handle CW. To
reduce the power requirements for barrage jamming, the PRC could deploy closer to
ground segments, but this again would be more dangerous and may provoke an aggressive
US response. Narrowband jamming would probably have little effect to a frequency
hopped EHF transmission as it would only cover a small portion of the wide bandwidth
EHF can offer. China could deploy the use of a follower jammer, a device that scans the
radio waves for a frequency that is being used and then jams it. This type of device,
however, would require a considerable amount of complexity and power in order to scan
for jam a message that is being hopped around hundreds of times a second.
COMERSAT is much more vulnerable to many forms of jamming. The lack of
onboard processing, lack of AJ capabilities, and ease of tracking suggest that methods such
as power stealing and CW could be successfully deployed. The wider beams that are used
also could allow China to position jammers on the mainland. However, because
COMERSAT is a civilian endeavor, jamming COMERSAT would disrupt more than just an
adversary's military communications. Because COMERSAT leases usage to many users
jamming it could bring about pressure from other nations and its own civilian sector, not
to mention the PLA SATCOM that utilizes COMERSAT.
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It should also be remembered that because jammers send out a signal, either to a
satellite or a ground segment, they can also be found using SIGINT. Aerial downlink
jammers, already vulnerable because of their proximity to adversarial forces, can be
further threatened because of this. Uplink jammers deployed on the mainland have an
advantage in that they can be concealed if pursued, can be mobile enough to evade some
attacks, and can be defended by anti-air or other military forces. Ship-borne jammers,
however, cannot hide so easily, but may be able to put up a fight if attacked.
To physically destroy elements of SATCOM, the Chinese would have to either
strike the ground stations maintaining the satellites, the ground relaying transmissions
stations, teleports, the user-end terminals, or the satellites themselves. Destroying the
maintenance stations, ground relays, or teleports may prove very difficult and very risky
because these elements are often outside the theater of conflict, in other nations, and, in
the case of TT&C stations, can be located on US soil. While user-end terminals can be
within striking range and within internationally or Chinese controlled locations, they are
carried by military units as the name implies. Thus, China would be attacking military
units directly.
Physically destroying a communications satellite is another option. While not the
focus of this study, China does appear to have some of the technologies capable of
performing simple forms of ASAT. For this reason it is given some breadth. However,
because its capabilities in this regard are speculative, it is best to view this option with
some reservation.
ASAT technology has caught the interest of the Chinese though their currently
ability to hit a satellite is questionable."7 Using directed-energy weapons (DEW) for
ASAT strikes would require a considerable amount of power even for attacking satellites
in LEO. Kinetic missile ASAT is also daunting as homing in and destroying a target that is
moving several thousand kilometers per hour at distances equal to half the circumference
117 DoD, Annual Report, pg 36; Globalsecurity, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/asat.htm.
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of the Earth can be an insurmountable task without a great deal of technology. However,
China has demonstrated the ability to launch satellites, as well as humans, into space.
Some methods of ASAT are as simple as launching a rocket into an intercept course with a
satellite. Given China's ability to track satellites, which is often done by amateur civilians,
and the public knowledge of orbital characteristics of many satellites, this should not be
overlooked. A space-detonation nuclear weapon is also a valid option, though it is
doubtful whether China believes affecting SATCOM warrants the use of such a weapon
considering the international backlash it would receive.
These options however do not account for less straightforward ASAT methods.' 8
Microsatellites could be deployed to parasitically attach themselves to target satellites,
waiting for a time to detonate. Because microsatellites, weighing only a tenth of a regular
satellite, and are so small, they could potentially be carried by larger satellites and
deployed covertly before a conflict arose. Various other methods using space mines and
other sleeper type weapons could be implemented as covertly with devastating effects.
Some of these methods, however, require orbital control technology that may be beyond
the Chinese abilities.
Another, much simpler method, would be to not require such much control.
Instead of targeting a specific satellite, it would be theoretically possible to force a satellite
to pass through a shrapnel field by launching hard particles, such as sand or metal
fragments, into a satellite's orbit. The particles themselves would not necessary need to be
moving very quickly because the satellite is. A collision between the particles and the fast
moving satellite would essentially have the effect of sending the particles into the satellite
at thousands of kilometers per hour. This could easily disable if not destroy a satellite.
While such an attack method is speculative, China's competency in space launch and its
desire to find Assassin's Maces suggest that this may not be a wholly unrealistic threat.
118 Wilson, "Threats". Wilson has a thorough discussion describing various ASAT techniques.
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ASAT also has interesting defensive properties. Depending on the ASAT method, it
may also be possible for the Chinese to launch an attack from as deep in the mainland as
they desire. This could significant reduce the ability of the US or another adversary from
executing successful interdiction operations because of the anti-air defense that could be
put in place. Also, once launched ASAT weapons become very hard to destroy and if
deployed before a conflict, as with sleeper type weapons, it may be impossible to know if
one was launched. If implemented correctly, ASAT attacks cannot be easily linked to a
deliberate IW offensive because the harsh environment of space could also be blamed for
satellite failures. This suggests that if China truly does have an ASAT capability, it would
be hard to defend against.
Summary
Table 4 below summarizes the threat the China poses to the military's use of
SATCOM. Threat here indicates an ability to take advantage of vulnerabilities that may
exist. Because of the level of secrecy and opacity of the Chinese publications, the ratings
in Table 4 should be thought of as conservative at best. Without a full understanding of
how China intends on implementing EW and Physical Destruction, its true knowledge of
SATCOM and ASAT, or its means to affect SATCOM, it is best to approximate China's
capabilities.
Table 4 - Chinese Threat to SATCOM
SATCOM Systems EW Threat ASAT Threat
UFO Medium - High Medium
DSCS Medium Medium
MILSTAR Low Medium
COMERSAT High Medium
The EW threat China could pose to the UFO system are given a score of medium to
high because China does possess the technology to implement power stealing and other
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forms of jamming which could exploit the lack of onboard processing and UHF links.
However, the UFO system does use EHF links which would be difficult to jam. The DSCS
system is scored as medium because power stealing and other forms of jamming such as
CW could be implemented, but the system does have some AJ capabilities. The EHF
transponders and onboard processing of the MILSTAR system would probably be difficult
for the Chinese to affect with their current technological level, so the threat to MILSTAR
is considered low. The Chinese do seem to have the necessary technologies to widely
affect COMERSAT through EW, though it is questionable whether they would attack
satellites that it and non-adversarial actors may be using. Because it is very likely that
they could successfully attack COMERSAT, COMERSAT is scored as high.
The Physical Destruction threat China poses to the military's SATCOM is scored as
medium. It is possible that China possess a developed ASAT that it does not publicize, but
some of technologies needed to implement some of the forms described seem to be
beyond China's reach. For this reason, Physical Destruction is scored as a medium. All the
systems are scored as medium is because the methods to directly attack any satellite in
orbit used are very similar. Armoring satellites is not a common practice and so all are
assumed to be equally vulnerable. The only difference would be between GEO and lower
orbiting satellites, because GEO satellites are much further away, but China has the
launch capability to reach GEO.1" 9
As shown, the Chinese pose a threat in the areas of Physical Destruction and EW.
The PLA is wrestling with the concepts of IW, as theoretic as they may be, and
developing insights that should not be overlooked. The PRC's technical ability is not yet
on par with that of the US and cannot be relied upon to produce some of the high
technology required for IW. However, as foreign investment continues to pour into China
and knowledge trickles from the private sectors into the military, this will change. Many
of the doctrines associated with the iRMA such as joint and precision warfare are
19 Chinese Defence Toady, http://www.sinodefence.com/space/satellite/default.asp.
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currently beyond the ability of the Chinese to implement, though it does appear to have
some capacity for IW and C2W.
Of the Six Pillars, EW and Physical Destruction are the most influential in
affecting SATCOM. The IW forte of the Chinese seems to be CNA, at least from open
sources, but China's present status suggests that it could undertake an EW, and possibly an
ASAT campaign against SATCOM.
While this finding is approximate at best, perhaps the two most important aspects
of China's ability to partake in IW are its secrecy and its desire to develop asymmetric
weapons with which to defeat a technologically superior adversary. If Assassin's Mace
rhetoric and the evidence of some IW capability only hint at China's true ability as some
authors believe, then it would be best to assume that China does indeed pose a threat to
SATCOM.
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Chapter 4
IW and the Taiwan Scenario
After considering the PRC's views of the iRMA, its growing knowledge-base, and
probable means to successfully attack SATCOM, it appears that the PLA could possibly
exploit vulnerabilities in the military's use of SATCOM. Knowing that vulnerabilities do
exist and that the PLA could take advantage of them does not, however, indicate the level
of threat this poses. Real life situations can include factors that may inhibit or enhance the
potential threat of an adversary. In order to better demonstrate the level of this threat, a
scenario in which the US responds to a PLA blockade of Taiwan was developed to provide
a simple qualitative measurement. After assessing both an escalatory and non-escalatory
IW campaign, this analysis finds that the PRC does pose an IW threat, though not as great
as their capabilities alone may suggest.
This chapter is broken into four sections: the first describes the scenario being
used, the second outlines the SATCOM systems that would be used by the US forces, the
third describes China's IW options, and the final section details the results.
Scenario Background
If there is to be any US conflict with the PRC in the near-term, it would most
likely concern Taiwan. The fragile US-PRC-Taiwan relationship is a complex one
allowing for no easy solutions. Each country is tied together through ideology, economics,
or treaties, yet the recently increased friction between the independence movements in
Taiwan and "one China" rhetoric of the PRC are making a confrontation ever more likely.
Though the US has not promised to aid the Taiwanese if it declares independence, it is
hard to believe that it would not become involved regardless of who shoots first given its
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interests to protect its Taiwanese trade partner, maintain stability in the Far East, and
resist China's territorial expansion.
The Department of Defense's (DoD) The Military Power of the People's Republic
of China 2005 describes several options the PLA may implement to reclaim Taiwan. Of
the four force options which would draw in the US, this author believes blockading
Taiwanese trade routes would be the most likely choice for several reasons. Firstly, the
other options, Limited Force, Air and Missile Campaign, and Amphibious Invasion all
create scenarios in which the US, not to mention other nations, could enter on the side of
Taiwan. Secondly, violent actions could easily foment Taiwanese nationalistic resolve,
making a successful campaign against Taiwan long, difficult, costly, and allowing more
time for outside intervention. Thirdly, victory would not be a given. The Taiwanese are
not without defense and cross-strait balance is not yet fully in favor of the PLA. Lastly,
blockading seems offensive enough to put a strain on Taiwan, yet benign enough to make
it difficult for the US to legitimate a use of force.
The DoD document describes the various forms of blockades the PRC might
implement, from laying mines near ports to forcing ships to be inspected on the Chinese
mainland before going to Taiwan to performing military exercises in the Taiwanese
shipping lanes. However, because the PLA Navy (PLAN) has limited blue-water
capabilities, it would only be able to implement some forms of blockade. Implementations
that require the PLAN to remain closer to Taiwan may prove too challenging for the
PLAN, while interdicting merchant vessels in the South and East China Seas would be the
least strenuous for the PLAN. 20 In any scenario, the US's first military response would
most likely be the deployment of one or two carrier groups.21 The US may seek to
120 DoD, AnnualReport, pg 41.
121 Though it is also likely that US Air Force elements would partake in the counter-blockade, naval forces
would present the most visible statement to the Chinese and the world. Naval forces are also physically able
to shield merchant vessels without firing weapons. An attack on the US Navy would then be of more
importance as it would have a larger effect.
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counter-blockade the PLAN or create a protected lane through which merchant vessels
may travel.
The Navy's Use of SATCOM
How then does attacking SATCOM affect this situation? The US Navy (USN) uses
SATCOM for a variety of forms of communications because the terrain over which it
fights does not permit the use of landlines or LOS communications very often. SATCOM
is used for communications between ships, submarines, land bases, and aircraft. 2 2 Because
describing the SATCOM links between individual ships, submarines, and so on can
become very lengthy, it may be easier to understand SATCOM as it is used tactically,
operationally, and strategically.
On a tactical level, SATCOM is used for coordination using data, voice, and fax. It
is also used for establishing and maintaining situation awareness. Because of the low
bandwidth requirements to transmit these types of information, low data rate or
narrowband systems, such as MILSTAR's LDR or UFO's UHF transponders, are often
used.
Operationally, SATCOM is used to connect higher bandwidth, long-haul
information, data, intelligence, voice, logistics planning, air tasking orders, video
conferencing, battle damage assessment, operations planning, and C2 information. These
types of communication require higher bandwidths than SATCOM's tactical links so
medium data rate systems, transmitting between 64 kbps and 1.544 Mbps, such as DSCS
are used.
In a strategic sense, SATCOM is used to link data, intelligence from national and
strategic sources, voice, CONUS logistic support, video conferencing, and Single
Integrated Operational Plans (SIOPs). For bandwidth and secure reasons, strategic
122 Globalsecurity, "Executive Summary of Commercial Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Report,"
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/navy/commrept/index.html.
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information is transmitted over SHF, EHF, and COMERSAT links. 123 Other types of
information that SATCOM carries which don't fall easily into any one category are video
telemedicine, imagery distribution, video tele-training, as well as remote maintenance/
technical assistance.
Of the MILSATCOM systems, UFO would probably be used the most since it was
created to replace the Navy's FLTSATCOM and has both UHF and EHF capabilities.
However, for wider bandwidth operational and strategic information, DSCS would be the
primary SATCOM provider. MILSTAR could be used for both LDR and MDR
transmissions and would undoubtedly supplement the other systems.
However, there are two reasons why MILSATCOM could not provide all of the
Navy's SATCOM needs. First, SATCOM is used very heavily by the military throughout
the world; therefore the Naval forces in this conflict could not use all of MILSATCOM's
available bandwidth. Second, the MILSATCOM systems are distributed around the world
in order to achieve as much global coverage as possible, meaning within each system the
satellites do not cover the same areas. Because of this, the Naval forces here simply would
not have access to the aggregate bandwidth capacity of MILSATCOM.
Though it is uncertain exactly how much bandwidth beyond MILSATCOM the
Navy would need, the facts that COMERSAT is widely used to make up bandwidth
shortfalls, that the SATCOM usage of engaged units increases greatly over peacetime
usage, and that leasing COMERSAT appears to be a regular occurrence in the Navy
suggest that COMERSAT will also most likely be used.124 Some of the COMERSAT
systems that would likely be utilized are the Telstar, Inmarsat, Intelsat, and Iridium
systems.25 Telstar, Inmarsat, and Intelsat all provide GEO, narrow and wideband coverage
123 Ibid.
1 24 Chisholm, "Buying Time".
125 Hunter C. Keeter, "Despite Delay, Navy Is Committed To Satellite Communication Program,"(Sea Power,
March 2004). Found at Find Articles,
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/miqa3738/is_200403/ain9371219#continue; Globalsecurity,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/inmarsat.htm; Globalsecurity, "Executive Summary of
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to the South-East area of China, each with a few satellites.12 6 These could be used for
operational to strategic SATCOM. The Iridium system provides wide area, narrowband
coverage over the area from many LEO satellites.2 7 Because the Iridium only provides
narrowband SATCOM, about 2.4 kbps, it could only be used for low data rate
communications such as voice, fax, and teletype. The vulnerability of SATCOM in this
scenario therefore covers the entire spectrum from the highly secure EHF links from UFO
and possible MILSTAR, to the vulnerable UHF and COMERSAT links.
Alternatively, if the IW threat to SATCOM is deemed too high, the USN forces
could fall back on other, non-SATCOM forms of telecommunication. However, to deploy
forces BLOS, this would require the use of frequency bands, such as UHF, VHF, and HF,
which do not have the bandwidth to transmit the wider band information that is
becoming critical. USN forces could deploy in such as way as to maintain LOS to attempt
microwave communication, though this may not be reliable on rolling seas nor does it
allow information to be dispersed quickly. Having to remain in LOS could also severely
impinge on its ability to effectively operate.
China's IW Options
As described in the previous chapter, China could best threaten SATCOM using
EW and, for completeness sake, physically destructive methods. An EW campaign against
SATCOM could call for the deployment of land-based, ship-based, and aerial jammers for
uplink and downlink jamming, depending on the deployment strategy of the USN because
distance from the jamming target can determine effectiveness. Such a campaign would
also require the launching of a Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and CNA campaign to
Commercial Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Report,"
http://www. fas.org/spp/military/docops/navy/commrept/index.html.
126 Intelsat, http://www.intelsat.com; Inmarsat, http://www.inmarsat.com; Loral Skynet,
http://www. loralskynet.com.
127 Iridium Satellite, http://www.iridium.com.
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properly map the SATCOM coverage areas for successful EW deployment and damage
assessment.
If the PRC does blockade Taiwan by redirecting merchant vessel to the mainland
first, the PRC could take advantage of the fact that US ships would have to be deployed
near China's coast by using uplink jammers positioned within protected and concealed
locations on the mainland. Doing so would allow them to inflict damage on the USN's
SATCOM while remaining relatively safe. If designed correctly, uplink jammers may also
be able to be deployed in fishing vessels, which may be able to approach the US ships with
less suspicion. If the USN does use COMERSAT systems such as Iridium, downlink
jamming may also be possible through the use of ground-based and ship-based platforms
because their user-end devices tend to be omni-directional.
Physical Destruction in this scenario could be accomplished by destroying the
ships, submarines, and aircraft in the area with SRBMs, IRBMs, anti-ship missiles, and a
host of other means depending on the deployment strategy the US Navy uses. Ground
bases in Taiwan and Japan, as well as the Pacific US territories and CONUS could also be
fair game. Furthermore, China could launch an ASAT assault against the military and
possibly even the commercial satellites orbiting over that sector of the world using
primitive methods such as the ones mentioned in the previous chapter.
Striking preemptively before the Navy can enter into the conflict would also make
it difficult for the US to come to the aid the Taiwanese. However, because the SATCOM
spot beams can be narrow and a jammer must be within the main or side lobes of a
satellite's antenna to harm it, EW would not be as effective as in this case. This would not
be the case with ASAT against MILSATCOM. If used early enough, ASAT could slow the
US entrance into the conflict by forcing them to cope with their communications
problems. This may give the Chinese the advantage they need in forcing the Taiwanese to
capitulate. Attacking MILSATCOM in this way could look very suspicious and escalate
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the blockade crisis into an open conflict. Thus, IW against SATCOM would be best used
in-theater, near the Chinese mainland.
Selectively choosing to attack narrow or wideband SATCOM can be accomplished
by using different jamming schemes or attacking certain satellite constellations. However,
because wideband RF bands can be used for narrowband communications, e.g. MILSTAR's
LDR EHF links, specifically attacking narrowband or wideband SATCOM could
necessitate attacking both narrow and wideband satellites. Attacking the SATCOM of a
specific vessel or unit can also be challenging as it would require the use of downlink
jamming or direct physical attack. It may be easier therefore to attack specific SATCOM
systems.
Each element of MILSATCOM is used for different yet important purposes. Which
systems the Chinese attack will depend on how they wish to affect the USN's efforts. If
UFO is attacked, tactical communication will be disrupted making it difficult for the USN
to perform operations. If DSCS is attack, collaborative planning between carrier groups,
CONUS based commands, and National Command Authorities (NCAs), logistics
information, and some operating communication could be affected. Disconnecting the
USN forces from the US in such a way may create a latency or confusion in deciding how
the USN forces should operate, which could politically jeopardize the US's efforts in
deterring China's blockade and may unnecessarily escalate the crisis. Attacking MILSTAR
or COMERSAT will also produce problems comparable to that of a dysfunctional UFO or
DSCS because they are used for similar types of communication.
Evaluating the Campaign
It cannot be known if the Chinese would try to maintain the blockade without
escalating the crisis into a shooting war with the US, or whether they may act on the
belief that its IW campaign would give them the chance to attack and defeat the USN
forces. However, this author believes that, while an IW campaign may make operations
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and diplomacy more difficult, it would be highly unlikely that a campaign alone would
enable the PRC to defeat the USN, and that PLA officials would probably agree. An
evaluation of a non-escalatory and an escalatory IW campaign proved useful in
understanding what level of threat the Chinese could pose. From this evaluation is appears
that a non-escalatory implementation would allow the Chinese the most success because
the US response in an open conflict may be prove insurmountable. However, even the
success gained during a stand-off may not be decisive enough to halt the USN's efforts.
Non -Escalatory IW Campaign
As found in the previous chapter, China poses the greatest IW threat to SATCOM
in the forms of EW jamming and possibly ASAT. However, some of the actions included
in implementing these forms of IW may incite an unwanted escalation of the crisis. Using
aerial downlink jammers, or ship-borne jammers may place PLA forces into a proximity to
the USN forces that may provoke retaliation or produce a tenser diplomatic situation.
Land-based jammers could be employed less provocatively, and because they could be
possibly concealed or mobile, there would be less hard evidence of intentional jamming.
Using land-based jammers would also allow the Chinese to defend their jamming
positions, possibly deploy their jammers deeper into the mainland, and even within
civilian populations. This would have the added advantage of deterring US interdiction
strikes that may have negative diplomatic consequences.
Even so, the US would not be without its own defenses. Given the wide usage of
SATCOM and its overall superiority, it is hard to believe that US would not perform
Electronic Protection operations to counter such attacks with some success, such as
performing SIGINT operations of own to avoid jammers or trying to position the satellite
coverage beams so that it would be difficult for China's jammers to effect SATCOM. The
presence of US forces could also make Chinese SIGINT operations difficult. The US forces
could also deliberately disrupt them, or flood the skies with misleading "military
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transmissions", and thus prohibiting the Chinese from tracking SATCOM traffic well and
taking full advantage of their jamming capabilities.
Physically attacking the ground segment of USN forces would be out of the
question, as they could be directly linked to the Chinese and would be considered an act
of war. Commencing ASAT operations, however, could be executed more covertly. While
missile launches could be detected by US surveillance systems, it would be difficult to link
the destruction or disruption of a SATCOM element to it. Furthermore, deploying sleeper
type ASAT weapons prior to the blockade could allow the Chinese to destroy satellites
with near impunity. 128 However, these systems require higher technologies than
launching debris and may be outside of China's capacities.
COMERSAT, however, may be better protected from either EW or Physical
Destruction attack than MILSATCOM because the satellites the USN forces are using
could also be used by other states' as well as the PRC's own civilians and military forces.
Attacking the control stations, teleports, and hopping stations for COMERSAT would also
be seen as escalatory, and may even incite international retaliation. Downlink jamming,
however, may still prove useful.
In all, it appears possible for the Chinese to widely affect almost every
MILSATCOM system without instigating a shoot war. The USN forces could attempt to
purchase more COMERSAT space, but they may find themselves competing with a
commercial market that may not be very sympathetic to their needs, depending on
COMERSAT providers that may not be able to quickly meet their needs, and having to
reequip in order to use some COMERSAT systems. Thus, a non-escalatory IW campaign
could prove very useful in maintaining a Taiwanese blockade and sowing doubt of the
US's ability to protect Taiwan in the minds of US and Taiwanese officials alike. Such
doubt, combined with economic strain could force the Taiwanese into capitulating.
128 This is of course contingent on the Chinese not destroying the satellites in a manner that would suggest
deliberate attack.
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Escalatory IW Campaign
If the Chinese do not wish to maintain a peaceful blockade of Taiwan, their IW
campaign can be wider in scale. The EW campaign would probably look quite similar to
that of a non-escalatory campaign with the exception of using aerial and ship-borne
jammers. However, the land-based jammers would need to be better defended, concealed,
or mobile. The difference would come because of the US response. If a shooting war broke
out, the USN would probably exercise much less restraint and aggressively go after
jammers. This could include air interdiction and cruise missile strikes, as well as anti-ship
and anti-air actions. Depending on the level of pressure the USN forces are able to
leverage, the Chinese may find it difficult to jam USN forces as persistently as in a non-
escalatory campaign, creating less than a total disruption of SATCOM and more of a
nuisance.
Attacking SATCOM ground segments physically becomes a more applicable option
in an escalatory campaign. However, for the Chinese to affect the ground segments, it
must be able to attack ships, as well as bases on US territories and in CONUS effectively.
The Chinese do possess a vast number of ballistic missiles, but they are not believed to be
accurate enough to efficiently attack ships or conventionally strike bases in the US or its
territories.129 An air campaign against the USN forces could only be successful if the
Chinese were willing to take many losses. In all likelihood, a ground segment strike may
not prove any more useful to the Chinese given their outdated equipment, and the USN's
superiority of force. It should also be noted that implementing this form of IW does not
allow the Chinese to take advantage of the asymmetric nature of IW, but rather forces
them to fight against US strengths.
ASAT attacks, however, would be more effective than in a non-escalatory
campaign. No longer fearing the implications of a direct attack, the Chinese could launch
129 Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, vol. 25, no. 2 (2000).
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attacks against every MILSATCOM satellite orbiting over the area. Because they could do
so from almost anywhere in China, launch facilities could be protected by the long stretch
of enemy airspace USN air strikes would have to fly through to interdict them. Sleeper
ASAT weapons deployed prior to the conflict would also prove far more effective, because
their placement would have been unknown.
COMERSAT, again, may be better protected from either EW or Physical
Destruction attack than MILSATCOM in this case. An aggressive USN campaign may
make even downlink jamming problematic. Attacking the control stations, teleports, and
hopping stations for COMERSAT may be beyond Chinese capabilities, and could easily
incite international retaliation.
In summary, an escalatory IW campaign may not provide the Chinese with many
more advantages of disabling SATCOM then a non-escalatory campaign. The major
difference comes from the increased implementation of ASAT. Again, it is doubtful that
the Chinese would attack COMERSAT in such a way because the satellites the USN uses
may also be providing SATCOM for other states' as well as its own citizens and military
forces. The strategies for jamming SATCOM would not be very different, though the US
response would be, thus making an effective campaign more difficult. Physically
destroying ground segments of SATCOM also appears to be too difficult for the Chinese,
or not to their advantage.
Results
In either case, EW and Physical Destruction could produce a real impact on the US
efforts. The US Navy's dependence on SATCOM for basic forms of communication could
allow a successful SATCOM attack to hamper, though probably not stop, it from
defending Taiwan. Without a connection back to commands in the US, the carrier groups
would probably find it difficult to negotiate the conflict as its logistics and coordination
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efforts would be disrupted. However, the EP campaigns the US forces may be able to
commence would probably make such disruptions only momentary.
A non-escalatory campaign seems to be more advantageous to the PLA than one
which leads to open conflict for two reasons. First, a standoff between PLA and USN
forces may make it diplomatically difficult for the US to aggressively enter Chinese
airspace to interdict land-based jammers without facing irreparable consequences, and so
would give a freer hand to the Chinese to disrupt the USN forces. Second, creating an
open conflict with the US would force the Chinese to fight a war which they are not
ready for, and would not allow IW to be the asymmetric edge it is believed to be. An IW
campaign in other scenarios, such as the ones described by the DoD Report, may also
prove less effective than the non-escalatory blockade because of these same reasons.
In conclusion, there are a number of vulnerabilities in the US's use of SATCOM
stemming from its dependence on SATCOM and inherent system weaknesses of which
the Chinese can take advantage. This qualitative analysis of a blockade scenario, which
this author believes is the most likely near-term situation which would place the PRC
across from the US, shows that China's IW capabilities may in fact be most threatening in
a peaceful blockade because international politics would allow them to be used more
asymmetrically than in an open conflict. Given the Chinese IW capabilities, it appears
that the UFO's UHF and DSCS's SHF transponders present the greatest vulnerability in
this scenario. Both of these are vulnerable to power stealing, and while DSCS does have
some AJ capabilities, even temporary collapses in the operational communication, which
would be of importance in a Taiwan crisis, could have large effects. However, a successful
IW campaign would prompt a quick US EP response, suggesting that China's effectiveness
would then be a function of how well it could thwart the US's countermeasures, which is
questionable. Though COMERSAT is a choice target, the Chinese may inadvertently be
harming their own efforts by attacking and so may choose not to attack it. ASAT appears
to be of great concern because it can greatly affect the US efforts before and during any
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counter-blockade actions and because it may be difficult to deter. However, as noted in
the previous chapter, the China's true ASAT capabilities are speculative, perhaps more so
than its EW capabilities, and so the findings of its threat here should be viewed as
cautionary and not descriptive.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the vulnerabilities that exist in the US
military's satellite communications and the Information Warfare threat the People's
Republic of China may pose to them. In order to do so, this thesis evaluated the
vulnerabilities that exist in the military's use of SATCOM, assessed the PRC's ability to
threaten SATCOM, and then made a qualitative analysis of the effect of a PRC attack on
the military's SATCOM during a blockade of Taiwan. As a result, this thesis posits that the
PRC can present a real threat to the military's use of SATCOM.
Though the level of this threat must be conservatively judged as moderate because
of the speculative nature of some of China's capabilities, it must be recognized that this
threat will grow with time. With every foreign military system and the rights to build
them, with every foreign joint commercial venture, and with every foreign technology
factory the PRC acquires, the more able it is to create its own high-tech systems.130 The
establishment of a national C3I network, its high rate of ISR satellite launches, and its
development of a new MILSATCOM series suggests that the PRC is becoming
increasingly familiar with the technologies necessary to implement a wide spectrum of
Information Warfare tactics.31
130 Sumner Lemon, "Report: Lenovo-IBM Deal to Face Review" (PC World; January 28, 2005) Accessed from
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,119488,pg,1,RSS,RSS,OO.asp. The Lenovo Group, China's largest
PC-maker and of whom the Chinese government owns the largest stock share, recently acquired IBM's PC
division which some believe will be a boost the modernization of the PRC and PLA; Accessed August 2,
2005; DoD, Annual Report, pg 23-25. Russia continues to be the PRC's largest supplier of foreign arms
which have included the advanced Su-30MK2 fighter, Sovremennyy-class destroyer, and Kilo-class
submarine though Britain and Israel have also sold technology. These past and continuing acquisitions have
consternated those who fear a cross-Strait balance that favors the PLA.
131 Chinese Defence Today, (February 6, 2005)
http://www.sinodefence.com/c4i/command/military-communications.asp; Accessed August 2, 2005; DoD,
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Implications for US SATCOM
The US military's satellite communications remain in a precarious situation. Its
dedicated systems, UFO, DSCS, and MILSTAR are only able to provide minimal, semi-
secure links, and the commercial systems that are used to fill the bandwidth shortfall are
vulnerable to most forms of noise jamming. The systems being launched in the near future
will have little impact in stemming this problem, further pushing the military to depend
on unreliable commercial sources. Even this source may not be a solution as the much
lower cost of sending information through fiber optic cable could stagnate the growth of
the COMERSAT market.132 There are only two solutions to this problem: build and
launch secure satellites that will better fill the gap, or reorient our forces to depend less on
satellite communications. These solutions, however, are not without their own
drawbacks.
In order for new satellites to satisfy the needs of the military, the satellite
constellation would have to be enormous. Using MILSTAR-II satellites as a model, the
system would need approximately 48 satellites and would cost $38.7 billion dollars.133
Even if the satellite system wouldn't be operational until 2015, it would cost $3.87 billion
annually, equating to 5% of the FY06 Defense appropriations budget.134 If split up among
the services, it would cut 14 %, 5.6 %, and 5.1 % out of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
appropriations budgets respectively. Initial procurement cost, however, would not be the
Annual Report, pg 35-36.From 2004-2006 the PRC intends to launch 10 satellites a year and reach an orbital
total of over 100 satellites by 2010. It also hopes to launch 100 more satellites by 2020.
132 Erhhard, "Standing in the Strategic Bandwidth Gap,".
133 MILSATCOM Joint Program Office, http://www.losangeles.af. miLSMC/MC/MILSTAR.htm; Accessed
July 10, 2005. Though MILSTAR is the most costly of the systems, it was chosen here because it is also the
most robust.
134 Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), "Procurement Programs (P-l)"
Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2006,
http://www.dod.miVcomptroller/defbudget/fy2006/fy2006_pl.pdf; Accessed July 10, 2005.
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total cost of the new system as with every passing year satellites in orbit get closer to
needing replacement. This is a costly solution.
Other alternatives may be more viable. If the military could utilize an air breathing
system costs could be cut dramatically. A network of high altitude aircraft, fitted with the
requisite equipment could service large areas by way of wide beams. The beams could be
narrow enough that jammers would need to be near the receiving antenna to uplink jam,
assuming active nulling is performed. The communications payloads could also be
upgraded and, if need be, repaired much easier than on a satellite.
One drawback to this alternative is that the aircrafts cannot provide a stationary
platform, requiring users to constantly adjust their antennas to stay connected. While this
is not entirely problematic, mobile tactical users may find that having to continually seek
a "satellite" creates unacceptable gaps in their information throughput. Specific flight
patterns could mitigate this drawback, but it can heighten another. Aircraft can be found
and shot down much easier than satellites allowing the Physical Destruction aspect of EA
to take on a larger role. Specific flight patterns would only make it easier to take
advantage of the aircrafts' nearness to Earth.
Much of today's bandwidth demand use comes from streaming video data. Video
conferencing can be a helpful tool in decision-making but it is not a critical one. Voice
conferencing supplemented with a non-streaming picture capability for sharing plans
pictorially could greatly reduce the burden on MILSATCOM. However, the many UAV's
of the FCS are also planned to provide streaming video to their users creating the necessity
for large amounts of bandwidth.
A quickly updatable digital representation of the combat situation is also growing
as a battlefield necessity, and is all but written into doctrine with the plans for FCS and
the Joint Visions. Obtaining Situational Awareness was one of the purposes of
digitalization and is fundamental to gaining Decision Dominance. It is unlikely that the
use of streaming video or the need for quickly updating Situation Awareness will change
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for the better, especially as more forces are equipped to handle such information. Creating
better data compression methods and efficient usage of bandwidth may be the only ways
to cope with the information throughput needs.
Looking Towards the Future
In conclusion, the use and control of information is becoming a fundamental
aspect of the way the military fights. Therefore, the communications links over which the
information flows must be secure, reliable, robust, and ubiquitous. Satellite
communications do offer some advantages in bringing this capability to the military's
forces, but the current systems which are used are lacking and will most likely continue to
lack in security.
The only options the military has then are to create the bandwidth necessary for
its communications or reduce its use of them. The monetary and political issues that
would surround the quick construction of a dedicated military satellite system to fill the
need, and the drawbacks of using alternative sources of bandwidth suggest that the
architecture of MILSATCOM should be given serious thought. Realistic measurements of
bandwidth need and supply must be performed before the military can structure its forces
around such systems.
Drawing back from such a heavy use of information would be almost, if not
completely impossible. Information is so central to the military's current and future
doctrines that a major shift in the way defense decision-makers think about warfare
would have to occur. In fact, after all the rhetoric permeating the defense world about
information, stepping away from the ubiquitous use of information would be the
equivalent of saying that the information RMA is really not a revolution after all. This is
unlikely to happen.
The way the military uses satellite information is vulnerable to Electronic Attack
in the form of noise jamming, as well as anti-satellite attack. This vulnerability has both a
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technological aspect and a political one. Technologically, the military's use of SATCOM is
vulnerable because some of the MILSATCOM systems are less than secure, and because
the commercial systems that are used were not designed to survive in an environment of
deliberate EA. Politically, SATCOM is vulnerable because of the dependence of
inadequately protected commercial and military systems which stems from a disconnect
between the military's bandwidth needs and its ability to supply it, as well as a
misperception of the threats the iRMA can produce. Until considerable thought, trade-
analysis, and architecture redesign are completed, the military's use of satellite
communications will continue to be a critically weak link of the transforming forces.
This thesis has shown that the PRC poses a moderate threat to the use of
SATCOM. This suggests that technologically similar states, more modem states, and
proficient non-state actors can pose a threat as well. The distinction between state,
military, and individual is an important one in the discussion of IW because of the power
leveling nature of IT.135 A vulnerability may not only be threatened by another nation's
military, but it can still be exploited by smaller groups or individuals. As the world
becomes smaller through globalization and informationalization, the number and potency
of threats becomes greater. If the vulnerabilities that SATCOM and other national IT
systems have are not addressed thoroughly and quickly36, both our security forces and our
society may find themselves prey to entities such as the People's Republic of China, and
even individuals, who identify the US as an enemy and have the desire to enjoy the
asymmetric advantages Information Warfare offers them.
135 Armistead, Information Operations, pg 32.
136 Armistead, Information Operations. This source assesses the vulnerabilities in a number of governmental
department and agencies and finds that better EP measure need to be taken.
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